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INTRODUCTION
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in
this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repeti-
tion of the plea as ancient as the world, and first interposed in Para-
dise: "The serpent beguiled me and I did eat." That defense was
overruled by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we may
form, or whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of
the tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime or give
indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of
civilized, not to say christian ethics, it never will.'
Despite this ominous prediction by the New York Supreme Court
in Board of Commissioners v. Backus, courts have recognized the need
for a criminal defense that "strike[s] a balance between criminal pre-
disposition and overzealous law enforcement practices."2 Courts saw
the need for this balance because "[h]uman nature is frail enough at
best, and requires no encouragement in wrong-doing."3 In the early
years of this century, American courts struck a balance between these
competing interests by recognizing the criminal defense of
entrapment.4
Commentators and courts have applied two strands of analysis to
the entrapment defense: the subjective approach and the objective
approach. The subjective approach to entrapment focuses on the
state of mind of the accused, while the objective approach concen-
trates on the involvement of government agents in the commission of
the crime in question. Although both analyses have merit, a hybrid
standard different from those proposed by commentators and used by
various courts would ensure greater fairness to criminal defendants.
This Note traces the history and development of the subjective
and objective entrapment analyses, as well as the hybrid approaches
proposed by commentators or applied in various jurisdictions. Within
this context, this commentary examines the recent Supreme Court
case ofJacobson v. United States,5 and analyzes the Court's approach to
1 Board of Comm'rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864).
2 PAUL MARcus, THE ENTRAPmENT DEFENSE 1 (1989).
3 Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878) (Marston, J., concurring).
4 See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
5 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
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the subjective entrapment defense. This Note asserts that theJacobson
opinion exemplifies some of the flaws inherent in the subjective ap-
proach to entrapment. Next, after weighing the comparative advan-
tages and disadvantages of the subjective and objective approaches to
entrapment, this Note proposes a new entrapment analysis which
combines elements of both. Finally, this Note applies the new analysis
to the facts of Jacobson to demonstrate its superiority over both the
subjective and objective tests.
I
BACKGROUND
A thorough review of the entrapment defense is required to un-
derstand the various approaches adopted by courts and commenta-
tors.6 In particular, a detailed overview of the history of entrapment
helps illustrate the doctrinal tensions which underlie Jacobson v. United
States7 and demonstrates the need for a superior entrapment analysis.8
A. Origins of the Entrapment Defense
In the late nineteenth century, American courts began to recog-
nize the validity of a doctrine that protected people from overreach-
ing government investigations. 9 However, the criminal defense of
entrapment was not officially recognized in the United States until
1915, when the Ninth Circuit decided Woo Wai v. United States.10 The
defendant, Woo Wai, at the urging of undercover immigration of-
ficers, transported Chinese immigrants across the Mexican border
into the United States in violation of certain immigration laws.
Although he at first rebuffed the government's suggestions that he
illegally transport the immigrants," the defendant finally acted after
several months of government persuasion.
6 For a synopsis of the history of entrapment, see Paul Marcus, The Development of
Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 5 (1986).
7 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1535.
8 Several commentators have expressed the need for changes in the current entrap-
ment doctrine that address both moral and political concerns. See, e.g., Charles E. Ander-
son, Racism and Entrapment: Critics Claim Black Officials Singled Out For Prosecution, 76 A.B.A.
J. 32 (Nov. 1990); Gary T. Marx, Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations: Some Reflections
On the State's Use of Sex and Deception in Law Enforcement 11 CRiM. JUST. Em-ics 13 (1992);
Seth Kaberon, Controls Needed For 'Stings, 130 CHI. DAILY L. B., Aug. 7, 1984, at 1; William
Safire, Legal or Not, TapingPhone Calls Is Morally Repugnant, LA. DAILYJ., Nov. 13, 1992, at 6.
9 See United States v. Adams, 59 F. 674 (D. Or. 1894); United States v. Whittier, 28 F.
Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688); O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. Crim. 665 (1879); Saun-
ders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878).
10 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
11 Woo Wai responded to the government's urgings: "This is in violation of the law.
It could not be done." Id. at 413.
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At trial, Woo Wai claimed that no crime had been committed
because government agents had induced him to commit the act.12
The Ninth Circuit reversed Woo Wai's conviction, stating that it is
"against public policy to sustain a conviction obtained in the manner
which is disclosed by the evidence in this case . . .a sound public
policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who are
thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal
statutes."'3
The court's decision contradicted prior case law from other juris-
dictions that rejected entrapment as a defense to a criminal charge.' 4
The Ninth Circuit distinguished those earlier decisions, where "the
criminal intention to commit the offense had its origin in the mind of
the defendant,"1 5 from Woo Wai, where "the suggestion of the criminal
act came from the officers of the government."16 The Woo Wai court
emphasized that the intent to commit the crime originated with the
government rather than the defendant. The court's policy seems
sound: The legal system should not condone government acts that
persuade an individual to commit a crime he otherwise would not
have committed.
B. The Development of. Divergent Doctrines: The Subjective
and Objective Approaches to Entrapment
As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Woo Wai, analysis of the
entrapment defense turns on the mental state of the defendant. The
court must determine whether the defendant would have committed
the crime "but for" government solicitation. However, courts quickly
recognized that the idea embodied by the entrapment defense, that
the government should not encourage otherwise innocent people to
commit crimes, could be expressed in several ways. 17 The landmark
Supreme Court decision, Sorrells v. United States,18 illustrates the early
development of a varied approach to entrapment analysis. 19
12 Id. at 412-13.
'3 Id. at 415.
14 Id. (citing People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904), where the court sustained a
conviction for a crime facilitated by detectives and state officers).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See discussion of the emergence and development of the objective and subjective
approaches to entrapment at the Supreme Court level infra notes 71-178 and accompany-
ing text.
18 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
19 Because the entrapment defense is not based on the Constitution, different juris-
dictions have discretion to adopt it and embrace a subjective, objective or hybrid approach
to entrapment. Some commentators argue that the entrapment defense has a constitu-
tional home in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as
in the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures. See, e.g.,
Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp.
[Vol. 79:995998
NOTE-ENTRAPMENT
1. The Sorrells Decision
The Supreme Court first recognized the validity of the entrap-
ment defense in the 1928 case of Sorrells v. United States.20 Coming
more than a decade after Woo Wai, Sorrells presented the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to endorse the entrapment defense. The
Sorrells Court found that the government entrapped the defendant as
a matter of law.21 The Court stated:
[T] he evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for
which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition
agent,... that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it
but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured
defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and
persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of
the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as
companions in arms in the World War.22
The Court recognized the need for an entrapment defense when "the
criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense." 23 This approach to entrapment has
been dubbed the "subjective" approach because it emphasizes the
state of mind of the accused rather than the reasonableness of the
government's conduct.24 Under this approach, the prosecution can
defeat the entrapment defense only by proving that the accused was
independently predisposed to committing the crime.25
To rationalize its subjective approach to entrapment, the Sorrells
majority invoked a rule of criminal statutory construction designed to
avoid absurd and unjust results.2 6 The majority reasoned that Con-
gress could not have intended criminal statutes to punish people
1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970); William C. Sherrill, Jr., The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Constitu-
tional Standards, 20 U. F.A. L. REv. 63 (1967).
20 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
21 Id. at 452. The facts of Sorrells are fairly straightforward. In order to expose viola-
tions of the National Prohibition Act, the government placed an informant in Haywood
County, North Carolina. Apparently, the defendant's reputation as a rumrunner
prompted the agent, posed as a tourist, to visit his home and attempt to purchase alcohol
in violation of the National Prohibition Act. Inside the defendant's home, the agent twice
asked the defendant if he could obtain liquor. Both times the defendant refused. After
being reminded by the agent that they were both war veterans, the defendant granted the
agent's third request for liquor.
22 Id. at 441.
23 Id. at 442.
24 The reasonableness of the government's conduct forms the crux of the objective
approach to entrapment, set forth below at notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
26 "Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the law and pro-
ducing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has frequently been condemned." Sor-
rells, 287 U.S. at 446.
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where government officials lured otherwise innocent citizens into the
commission of a crime.27 Since Congress did not intend to punish
those who lacked the predisposition to commit the crime, the Court
concluded that entrapment analysis should focus on the defendant's
state of mind.28 Hence, it used a subjective approach to entrapment.
Although Justice Roberts agreed with the majority's substantive
result, his concurring opinion took a very different approach. Justice
Roberts focused on the conduct of the government rather than the
state of mind of the accused. He argued that the entrapment defense
did not rest upon a "strained and unwarranted construction of...
[criminal] statute [s]." Rather, it rests upon "a fundamental rule of
public policy" which grants exclusive power to (and imposes a duty
upon) a court to protect its own functions and preserve "the purity of
its own temple."29 Therefore, according to Justice Roberts, the en-
trapment doctrine should protect society from government overreach-
ing by denying convictions "instigated by the government's own
agents." 0
Sorrells v. United States thus generated two separate strands of en-
trapment analysis. With its focus on the predisposition of the accused,
the Sorrells majority endorsed a subjective approach to entrapment,
while Justice Roberts, who focused upon the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents, recommended a more objective approach.
2. Development of the Sorrells Approaches
This Note now examines the modern doctrinal characteristics of
both of the Sorrells approaches, as well as the relatively recent evolu-
tion of dual entrapment analyses which combine elements of both.
a. The subjective approach
The defendant's relationship with the government forms the ba-
sis of the subjective entrapment test, which concentrates mainly on
two factors: inducement and predisposition.3' Inducement consti-
tutes the threshold requirement that the defendant must meet before
the court will consider predisposition. Initially, the defendant has the
27 Id. at 448.
28 Id. at 451.
29 Id. at 456-57. Some critics argue that Justice Roberts' theory violates the doctrine
of separation of powers. See Edmund P. Bergan, Jr., Case Note, Entrapment in the Federal
Courts-Subjective Test Reaffirmed Against Lower Court Departures, 42 FoRaDHi L. REv. 454,
460 (1973) (arguing that because the power to grant clemency belongs to Congress and
the Executive, courts may only refuse to punish guilty defendants on constitutional as op-
posed to public policy grounds).
30 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
31 MARcus, supra note 2, at 116. Presently, all federal courts and a majority of state
courts focus their entrapment analyses upon the predisposition of the accused.
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burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced
the defendant to commit the offense.3 2 Even at the federal level,
courts disagree on the degree of inducement required to satisfy this
evidentiary threshold. 33 In any event, the defendant often has an easy
burden to meet.3 4 Once the defendant establishes inducement, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the defendant's pre-
disposition to commit the crime.
The issue of predisposition lies at the center of the traditional
subjective entrapment analysis. 35 The Supreme Court's justification
for the entrapment defense in Sorrells reflects the importance of the
predisposition factor: Congress did not intend "persons otherwise in-
nocent" to be punished for committing crimes at the behest of gov-
ernment agents.3 6 Whether the accused was predisposed to commit
the crime depends on whether he was "willing or eager to become
involved in the criminal enterprise."37
When determining the defendant's predisposition, the trier of
fact 38 is instructed to consider all relevant facts which may contribute
to an assessment of the defendant's state of mind.39 Courts recognize
that "there is no infallible means of divining a defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit a crime after the fact... [because] predisposition is, by
definition, 'the defendant's state of mind and inclination before his
32 Ia. at 121.
33 See generally United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring evi-
dence which amounts to "more than a scintilla"); United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903,
914 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979) (requiring "some evidence" of gov-
ernment inducement).
34 See MARcus, supra note 2, at 121 (stating that "the quantum of evidence needed on
the inducement point is quite limited"). However, not all government involvement consti-
tutes impermissible inducement. For instance, it is not enough for the defendant to show
that the government offered the opportunity to commit an illegal act. Courts require
some further amount of overreaching. For a more complete analysis of the inducement
issue, see id. at 120-32.
35 For an in-depth discussion of the interpretations of "predisposition" offered by
courts and commentators, see Jeffrey N. Klar, Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to Entrap-
ment, 59 WAsH. U. L.Q. 199, 200 n.10 (1981).
36 Sorells, 287 U.S. at 448; see supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
37 MARcus, supra note 2, at 133.
38 The determination of the defendant's state of mind is a question of fact which is
ordinarily for the jury to decide. However, in circumstances where the evidence clearly
shows that the accused possessed no independent tendency to commit the offense, courts
may determine as a matter of law that the defendant lacked the necessary predisposition.
For a complete discussion of the jury's role in determining predisposition, see MARcus,
supra note 2, at 136-38. For examples of cases in which predisposition was lacking as a
matter of law, see discussions of Sherman v. United States, infra notes 77-89 and accompany-
ing text, and Jacobson v. United States, infra notes 124-78 and accompanying text.
39 For a complete explanation of the factors assessed by the trier of fact, see MARcUs,
supra note 2, at 141-62.
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initial exposure to government agents.' "40 However, courts have
cited several factors as crucial to the predisposition determination.
Factors indicating "[p] roof of predisposition can range from prior acts
to later acts, from the defendant's eagerness to evidence of his reputa-
tion. All of these may properly be viewed in evaluating the defen-
dant's state of mind for purposes of the entrapment defense."4' If the
prosecution, relying on such evidence, demonstrates to the jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to com-
mit the offense, the subjective entrapment defense will fail.42
b. The objective approach
The Supreme Court's subjective approach to entrapment has
spread throughout the federal court system and beyond to a majority
of state jurisdictions.43 While the subjective approach focuses on the
predisposition of the accused, the objective approach to entrapment
emphasizes the propriety of police conduct in "reverse sting" opera-
tions.44 Presently, a minority of states endorse the objective approach,
either through legislative enactment or judicial pronouncement. 45
An examination of the common law of several states allows insight
into the variety of objective approaches to entrapment.46 Alaska was
the first state to adopt an objective entrapment analysis in its 1969
supreme court decision of Grossman v. State.47 The Alaska Supreme
40 United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting United
States v.Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). See also United States v. Navarro, 737
F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir.) (quoting Kaminski andJannotti), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984).
41 MARcus, supra note 2, at 146.
42 Commentators have voiced concern that the subjective entrapment analysis' em-
phasis on the predisposition of the accused will often motivate the jury to disregard the
issue of police misconduct. See Stephen G. Mirakian, Note, Entrapment: Time to Take an
Objective Look, 16 WASHBURN LJ. 324, 336 (1977); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and IDid
Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965) [hereinafter
Yale Note].
43 See Marcus, supra note 2 (outlining the objective and subjective tests used by various
states).
44 Id. at 83.
45 States that have adopted the objective approach include: Alaska, ALAsKA STAT.
§ 11.81.450 (1989); Arkansas, Ama CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 1987); Colorado, COLO
REv. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1986); Hawaii, HAw. REv. STAT. § 702-237 (1988); Iowa, State v. Mul-
len, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa, 1974); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (1988); Michigan,
People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1973); New York, N.Y. PENAL LA-w § 40.05 (Mc-
Kinney 1987); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1993); Pennsylvania, 18 PA.
CoNs. STAT. § 313 (1983); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (Vernon, 1973); Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (1990); Vermont, State v. Wilkins, 473 A.2d 295 (1983).
46 See cases cited supra note 45.
47 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969). In Grossman, the government assigned agent Turner to
report on criminal activities in the Anchorage area during November, 1967. During the
several months Turner spent frequenting the defendant's bar, he requested and procured
marijuana and amphetamines from the defendant. Finally, after a series of unsuccessful
requests by the agent, the defendant supplied him with a ten "fixes" of morphine, in viola-
tion of ALsKA STAT. § 17.10.010 (repealed 1982). The trial court convicted the defendant.
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Court tried to establish "a workable or rational set of rules for... [the]
application" of the entrapment defense.48 The court rejected the sub-
jective approach outlined in Sorrells after concluding that it rested
upon a weak foundation:
To speak of entrapment as an implied statutory condition, and then
to focus inquiry on the origin of intent, the implantation of criminal
design, and the predisposition of the defendant does not make
much sense. If entrapment is a substantive condition of guilt, then
it ought to apply when private persons induce the commission of an
offense.49
According to the Grossman court, if the entrapment doctrine rests
upon an implied legislative intent to abstain from punishing those
who lack an independent predisposition to criminal behavior, then it
is illogical to distinguish between inducement by government agents
and by private individuals.50 Both cases lead to the same result: a
person is enticed to commit a crime he would not otherwise have
committed.
The Grossman court adopted an objective approach to entrap-
ment because "[a] n external standard, if it can be achieved, is cer-
tainly preferable to a doctrine founded in theoretical riddles."51
Although it recognized that an effective law enforcement process
sometimes requires government involvement, the court stated:
"[i] nducements should be limited to those measures which, objectively
considered, are likely to provoke . .. the commission of crime only
[by] those persons, and not others, who are ready and willing to com-
mit a criminal offense."52 The Court concluded that the entrapment
analysis should focus on the conduct of the police, stating:
[U]nlawful entrapment occurs when a public law enforcement offi-
cial, or a person working in cooperation with him, in order to ob-
tain evidence of the commission of an offense, induces another
person to commit such an offense by persuasion or inducement
which would be effective to persuade an average person, other than
one who is ready and willing, to commit such an offense.53
48 Id. at 227.
49 Id. at 229.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. The Grossman Court offered some examples of government conduct that would
trigger a successful entrapment defense based on the objective approach: pleas of illness,
appeals based upon pity or close friendship, and offers of "inordinate" sums of money. Id.
at 230. Although the court recognized that this construction of the entrapment defense
might provide a "ready escape hatch" through which those predisposed to commit crimes
may routinely escape prosecution, it responded that considerations ofjustice outweighed
that risk. "under standards of civilized justice, there must be some control on the kind of
police conduct which can be permitted in the manufacture of crime." Id.
19941 1003
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California has also embraced an objective entrapment analysis.
In the 1979 case of People v. Barraza,5 4 the California Supreme Court
conducted a thorough analysis of both the subjective and objective
tests for entrapment, and ultimately chose the latter.55 Arguing
against the subjective approach, the court found it patently unfair to
determine the criminal predisposition of the accused by evaluating
past acts rather than by focusing on the particular characteristics of
the transaction in question. The court found the objective approach
superior because it ignored the defendant's past activities, while the
subjective test relied upon such evidence to gain insight into the de-
fendant's state of mind before the crime. The Barraza court declared
that the success of the entrapment defense should not depend upon
"differences among defendants; we are not concerned with who first
conceived or who willingly, or reluctantly, acquiesced in a criminal
project.... [W]e... care about... how much and what manner of
persuasion, pressure, and cajoling are brought to bear by law enforce-
ment officials to induce persons to commit crimes."5 6 The court con-
cluded that the proper entrapment test should ask whether "the
conduct of the law enforcement agent [is] likely to induce a normally
law-abiding person to commit the offense?" 57
A number of states have adopted the objective approach to en-
trapment by statute rather than judicial decision.58 Section 2.13 of
54 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979). The defendant in Barraza was arrested for selling heroin
to an undercover agent at the agent's request. When the undercover agent approached
Barraza, he stated that he had kicked his heroin addiction through a drug rehabilitation
program. According to the agent's own testimony, the defendant was "hesitant to deal"
because of his criminal record.
55 Before entering into its comparative analysis, the Barraza court observed that the
entrapment defense has broad implications for the criminal justice system:
[E)ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and
seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it
is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motiva-
tions. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is
condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known
criminals or the 'criminal classes,' justifies the employment of illegal
means.
Id. at 955. (quoting Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons,
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1111 (1951)).
56 Barraza, 591 P.2d at 954.
57 Id. at 955. This test stops short of proscribing all government involvement with the
commission of crimes. Decoy programs usually offer only an opportunity for the criminal
to act, and do not "pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajol-
ing, importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding person
to commit the crime." Id. Although the inquiry should focus on the conduct of law en-
forcement agents, it is not to do so in a vacuum; the determination must take into account
"the transactions preceding the offense, the suspect's response to the inducements of the
officer, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission."
Id. The court here refers the reader to Grossman, 457 P.2d at 230.
58 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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the Model Penal Code is typical of objective entrapment statutes.59
Under section 2.13, entrapment occurs when the law enforcement of-
ficial or his agent "induces or encourages another person to engage in
conduct constituting such an offense by ... employing methods of
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk that such an
offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready
to commit it."60 The Model Penal Code thus focuses on whether the
government's conduct "creates a substantial risk" of ensnaring law-
abiding citizens. The standard disregards subjective characteristics of
the individual defendant, like mental state, and is aimed solely at de-
terring wrongful government conduct.
c. The hybrid approach
Several states have developed hybrid approaches to entrapment
which combine elements of both the subjective and objective tests out-
lined above. New Jersey,61 Florida6 2 and Indiana6 3 have promulgated
criminal statutes codifying hybrid approaches. In addition, both New
Hampshire 64 and New Mexico 65 have developed hybrid approaches
through their respective common law.66
The New Jersey law represents the approach taken by jurisdic-
tions adopting a hybrid approach via statute:
(a) A public law enforcement official... perpetrates an en-
trapment if... he induces or encourages and, as a direct result,
causes another person to engage in [illegal] conduct.., by either:
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to in-
duce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which
create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by
persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
(b) [A] person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if
he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct oc-
curred in response to an entrapment. 67
59 The Model Penal Code's approach to entrapment typifies generic objective entrap-
ment statutes in that it concentrates on the permissibility of government conduct, rather
than the mental state of the accused. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985).
60 Id.
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1982).
62 FIA. STAT. ANN. § 777.201 (West 1992).
63 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (Bums 1985).
64 See State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517 (N.H. 1981).
65 See Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987).
66 Of these hybrid jurisdictions, only Florida and New Mexico consider the objective
and subjective prongs of analysis to be independently sufficient to find entrapment. In
other words, either a showing of subjective entrapment or a showing of objective entrap-
ment would constitute sufficient grounds for acquittal. The remaining jurisdictions re-
quire that both tests be satisfied.
67 N.J. STAT. AN. § 2C:2-12 (West 1982).
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This statute incorporates elements of the objective approach into part
(a) by drawing explicit limits on the permissible actions of govern-
ment agents attempting to entice an individual to commit a crime.
However, part (b) of the statute touches upon the crucial element of
the subjective test: the defendant's state of mind. It does so by al-
lowing the defendant to show that he would not have committed the
offense "but for" the government interference. If the defendant
proves this by a preponderance of the evidence, the entrapment de-
fense must succeed.
The objective and subjective elements of the statute appear to
exist independently. Thus, if a defendant can satisfy either the subjec-
tive or the objective prongs of the statute, she will have a successful
entrapment defense. In practice, however, courts have required that
both prongs be satisfied.68 As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted,
"NJ.S.A. 2C:2-12a(2) changed the definition of entrapment to require
both that the police conduct created a substantial risk that the crime
would be committed by people who were not predisposed to commit
it and that it caused the particular defendant to commit the crime." 69
In other words, "the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the police conduct constituted entrapment by both ob-
jective and subjective standards."70
New Mexico's hybrid test, on the other hand, does not require
that both the objective and subjective tests be met.7 1 The New Mexico
Supreme Court in Baca v. State72 chose to expand the existing statu-
tory defense of entrapment by allowing "a criminal defendant... [to]
successfully assert the defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of
predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that
the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation."73
68 State v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236 (NJ. 1984).
69 Id. at 1239.
70 Id. at 1241. New Hampshire also requires that a defendant meet both a subjective
and objective test for entrapment. See State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517 (N.H. 1981) for an
explanation of the similar approach taken by this jurisdiction.
71 See Baca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987). Florida has taken a similar approach
in Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1985) by allowing the
satisfaction of either the objective or subjective prongs to result in entrapment.
72 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987).
73 Id. at 1046 (emphasis added). For an in-depth analysis of the reasoning behind
and the implications of the Baca decision, see Barbara A. Mandel, Note, New Mexico Ex-
pands the Entrapment Defense: Baca v. State, 20 N.M. L. REv. 135 (1990).
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C. The Supreme Court Before Jacobson: Objective or Subjective
Entrapment?
The Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in
Sorrells v. United States,74 and adopted the subjective approach.75 How-
ever, the Supreme Court decisions following Sorrells often have been
inconsistent on the question of whether to apply the subjective or ob-
jective test. A majority ofJustices have consistently applied the subjec-
tive approach to entrapment analysis, strengthening that approach
over time. These developments provide the historical backdrop for
the Court's decision in Jacobson v. United States.76
1. Sherman v. United States
Sherman v. United States77 was the first post-Sorrells Supreme Court
decision on entrapment.78 The defendant was charged with selling
narcotics to a government agent. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed
the lower court's holding and found that the defendant had been en-
trapped as a matter of law.79 The Sherman majority embraced the sub-
jective approach by adhering to Sorrells.80 The Court reasoned that
the judicial system must distinguish between government activity
which sets "the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the un-
wary criminal."8' According to the majority, such government activity
could be identified by concentrating on the mental state of the ac-
cused to determine whether the individual was indeed "innocent" or
"criminal. 82 The majority thus relied upon a determination of
whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.
The concurring opinion offered by Justices Frankfurter, Douglas,
Harlan and Brennan urged the majority to reconsider the subjective
analysis of entrapment. Frankfurter, writing for the remaining three
Justices, favored the objective test over the "sheer fiction" of the sub-
74 287 U.S. 435, 443 (1932).
75 See supra notes 18.40 and accompanying text.
76 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
77 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
78 In Sherman, the government agent first met the defendant while both were in a
doctor's office to receive medical treatment for narcotics addiction. Several more meet-
ings under similar circumstances followed, in which the agent and the defendant shared
their experiences dealing with narcotics addiction and treatment. Finally the agent asked
the defendant if he knew of a good source for narcotics. After "a number of repetitions of
the request," the defendant procured for the agent a quantity of narcotics which they
shared between them. The defendant cooperated with the agents request several times
thereafter, prompting his indictment charging three sales of narcotics. Id. at 371.
79 id. at 369, 378.
80 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). A discussion of the Sorrells decision is
set forth supra at footnotes 18-28 and accompanying text.
81 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
82 Id. at 372, 373.
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jective approach.83 The concurring Justices believed that the Court
should rethink the Sorrells decision because:
In a matter of this kind the Court should not rest on the first at-
tempt at an explanation for what sound instinct counsels. It should
not forego re-examination to achieve clarity of thought, because
confused and inadequate analysis is too apt gradually to lead to a
course of decisions that diverges from the true ends to be
pursued.8 4
According to these four Justices, the entrapment defense should pur-
sue the "true ends" of providing limits on the legitimacy of govern-
ment conduct geared towards the detection and prosecution of those
who break the law.85 Indeed, "the federal courts have an obligation to
set their face against enforcement of the law by lawless means."86 The
concurringJustices felt that the objective approach to entrapment bet-
ter provided the means to attain these ends.
The Sherman majority's decision to analyze the defendant's pre-
disposition may be seen as an affirmation of the subjective test of en-
trapment first set forth in Sorrells v. United States.8 7 However, two
aspects of Sherman indicate that the strength of the subjective test re-
mained far from overwhelming.88 First, since four of the nine Justices
remained wedded to the objective approach, the objective test re-
mained one Justice away from the majority opinion. In addition, the
Sherman decision achieved significance because it involved a reviewing
court reversing a lower court to find entrapment as a matter of law. In
so deciding, the Sherman Court disregarded evidence of the defen-
dant's prior convictions despite the fact that past acts were thought to
be legitimate factors that a court should consider in determining pre-
disposition.8 9 In light of these factors, it seems that Sherman v. United
States added little strength to the subjective approach at the Supreme
Court level.
2. United States v. Russell
In United States v. Russel 90 the Supreme Court affirmed the pre-
ferred status of the subjective approach to entrapment. In Russell the
defendant was convicted on charges of selling methamphetamines to
83 Id. at 379.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 380.
87 Id. at 382.
88 See supra part I.C.1.
89 The evidence consisted of a nine-year-old sales of narcotics conviction and a five-
year-old conviction for possession of narcotics. Sorre/ls, 287 U.S. at 375. Evidence of such
convictions is routinely submitted to the trier of fact to assist in a determination of whether
the accused was predisposed to commit the offense.
90 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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an undercover agent.91 Although the majority in Russell, like that in
Sherman, consisted of only five Justices, their decision to affirm the
lower court's conviction may be read as adding significant strength to
the subjective analysis.
The Russell majority decided that government agents had not en-
trapped the defendant even though they supplied him with a chemi-
cal ingredient essential to the drug manufacturing process.92 The
chemical had become scarce because private pharmaceutical compa-
nies had ceased selling it at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs.93 The Court concluded that since Russell was
predisposed to manufacture and sell the drug, the government's con-
duct did not "implant[] the criminal design in the mind of the defen-
dant," and thereby did not entrap him.94 The Court's analysis
strengthened the subjective approach to entrapment by emphasizing
the predisposition of the defendant, notwithstanding the govern-
ment's participation in the crime. The Court's focus on predisposi-
tion thwarted Russell's entrapment defense even though the
government played a crucial role in the criminal act by supplying him
with an essential and scarce ingredient. Indeed, "but for" the govern-
ment involvement in this case, the defendant would not have commit-
ted this particular crime.9 5
In addition, unlike in Sherman, the defendant in Russell expressly
requested that the Court replace its subjective entrapment analysis
with the objective approach.96 Nonetheless, the Russell majority fol-
lowed the precedent set forth in Sorrells and Sherman, leaving the sub-
jective analysis intact.97 The Russell majority concluded that the
legislature would be in a better position to delineate the true dimen-
91 Id. at 424, 427.
92 Id. at 436.
93 Id. at 426-27.
94 Id. at 436.
95 The manufacture of the narcotic sold to the undercover agents in Russell was possi-
ble only due to the government's contribution of ingredients. Although the subjective
entrapment analysis is premised on an assurance that only the subjectively guilty will be
punished, the Russell decision resulted in quite the reverse. Subjectively speaking, the de-
fendant Russell would never have committed this offense if the government hadn't as-
sisted. The irony of the result is obvious.
96 As the Sherman Court stated:
It has been suggested that in overturning this conviction we should reassess
the doctrine of entrapment according to principles announced in the sepa-
rate opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
453. To do so would be to decide the case on grounds rejected by the
majority in Sorrels and, so far as the record shows, not raised here or below
by the parties before us. We do not ordinarily decide issues not presented
by the parties and there is good reason not to vary that practice in this case.
356 U.S. 369, 376 (1957). The Court in Russell v. United States was not similarly restricted.
411 U.S. at 430-33.
97 Russe/4 411 U.S. at 433.
10091994]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sions of the entrapment analysis if they disagreed with the Court's in-
terpretation of the subjective approach: "Since the defense [of
entrapment] is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may ad-
dress itself to the question [of choosing between the subjective and
objective approaches] and adopt any substantive definition of the de-
fense that it may find desirable."98
The Russell Court's strengthening of the subjective approach
should not be overemphasized. As was the case in Sherman, the Russell
majority consisted of only five Justices. Also, as in Sherman, the four
dissenting Justices felt that the objective approach was the better
method to use in entrapment analysis.99 In Russel, however, fourJus-
tices dissented because they felt that under the objective analysis, the
defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. The dissenters felt that
the entrapment defense was created because "the Government 'may
not provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal, its crea-
ture.'"100 The fact that the government supplied the defendant with a
necessary ingredient convinced the dissenters that the government
was an "active participant" in the illegal activity. 1 1 The dissent be-
lieved that the government went too far in its pursuit of the defen-
dant, and its actions constituted entrapment under the objective
approach. 102
3. Hampton v. United States
The subjective approach to entrapment continued to gain
strength at the Supreme Court level with the 1976 case of Hampton v.
United States.'03 This case represents the Supreme Court's most liberal
view of government involvement in criminal activity that has not trig-
gered a valid subjective entrapment defense. The defendant in Hamp-
ton was convicted of selling heroin to an undercover government
98 Id.
99 Id. at 436. However, only two of the four dissenting Justices in Russell had also
favored the objective approach in their Sherman concurrence. This fact suggests the pro-
gress of the objective strand toward becoming good law. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas,
Harlan and Brennan concurred in Sherman, while Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall
dissented in Russell.
100 Id. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413,
428 (1928) (dissenting opinion)).
101 Id. at 437 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
102 Under the majority's subjective analysis, however, the fact that the defendant was
inclined to produce and sell the illegal drug, and indeed had been doing so for some time,
effectively precluded his entrapment defense. Since this was the route of analysis offered
by five out of nine Justices, the conviction was affirmed.
103 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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agent. 0 4 The entrapment defense failed even though the govern-
ment supplied the narcotic to the defendant.10 5
The plurality opinion paid little attention to the extent of govern-
ment involvement, holding that the success of an entrapment defense
hinges upon the state of mind of the defendant. 06 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the plurality, stated that the subjective test "ruled out the
possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon
governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one, where the pre-
disposition of the defendant to commit the crime was established." 1°7
Under Rehnquist's interpretation of the subjective approach, once
predisposition is established, the egregiousness of government in-
volvement becomes irrelevant. 0 8 Justices Powell and Blackmun con-
curred in the judgment of the plurality insofar as they agreed that the
defendant was without a defense in the present action. 10 9
Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall dissented from Rehn-
quist's plurality opinion.110 Brennan once again championed the ob-
jective over the subjective approach to entrapment. According to the
dissenting opinion, "courts [should] refuse to convict an entrapped
defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of
the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods
employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction can-
104 Id. at 485.
105 Id. at 485-87. This set of facts is somewhat different than in Russell where the Gov-
ernment supplied the defendant with a legal but scarce chemical compound which was
essential to the manufacture of the drug.
106 Id. at 488-89 (plurality opinion).
107 Id.
108 Rehnquist's position that any government conduct should be considered legitimate
so long as the defendant is predisposed to commit the offense seems extreme. Such a
stance would be less intimidating if one considers that the defendant also possesses a due
process defense to guard against particularly egregious conduct. However, Rehnquist also
limits the scope of the due process defense to only those instances where the government
conduct encroaches upon a constitutionally protected right. Id. at 490. Since the police
conduct here did not deprive Hampton of any right guaranteed him by the Constitution,
the due process defense was unavailable as an alternative remedy to entrapment. Rehn-
quist (and presumably Burger and White, who joined his opinion) effectively gives the
government a free hand with which to coax, induce, and persuade an individual to commit
a crime so long as the government abuses no right guaranteed by the Constitution, and the
trier of fact reasonably finds him predisposed to commit the same offense independently.
For a discussion of the origin and development of the due process "spin" on entrapment,
see KIar, supra note 35, at 203-09.
109 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491-95. The two disagreed, however, with the limited concep-
tion of the due process defense offered by Rehnquist. See supra note 108. Although both
Powell and Blackmun adhered to the predisposition-intense focus of the subjective ap-
proach to entrapment, both recognized that limits must be placed upon the freedom of
the government to encroach upon the individual liberty of citizens. Id. at 493 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
110 Id. at 495. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration of the case.
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not be countenanced.""' Under the objective approach, Brennan
concluded that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law."12
The dissentingJustices opined that when a government agent supplies
the accused with contraband for the purpose of arresting the individ-
ual later when he sells it back to the government, "the... case falls
below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of governmental power.""13 In such cases, the "Government is do-
ing nothing less than buying contraband from itself through an inter-
mediary and jailing the intermediary" such that the "intermediary" is
thereby objectively entrapped. 14 Indeed, the very fact that such ex-
treme circumstances failed to garner additional support for the objec-
tive approach to entrapment illustrates the degree to which a majority
of the Supreme Court's Justices embrace the subjective approach.
4. Mathews v. United States
The 1988 decision of Mathews v. United States 15 solidifies the
Supreme Court's preference for the subjective approach to entrap-
ment,"16 but sheds little light upon the development of entrapment
analysis. The Mathews Court did not conclude whether or not the de-
fendant was entrapped in this particular case. Instead, the Court lim-
ited its scope of review to the procedural issue of whether a court may
instruct ajury with regard to entrapment while the defendant simulta-
neously denies the commission of the crime.1 17 In reversing the lower
court, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is free to plead con-
tradictory defenses under such circumstances.11 With regard to the
subjective/objective entrapment debate, Justice Rehnquist reiterated
his conviction that the subjective approach is more appropriate, and
I11 Id. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369, 380 (1958)).
112 Id. at 497.
113 Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973)).
11A Id. at 498-99.
115 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
116 The defendant in Mathews was an official in the Small Business Administration who
provided government aid to small businesses. However, the government suspected that
the defendant was hesitant to give aid to certain small corporations unless these corpora-
tions agreed to supply the defendant with 'loans.' After repeatedly requesting such a loan
from the president of a small company in need of assistance, the corporation official
agreed to offer the money. After receiving the money under the surveillance of the FBI,
the defendant was arrested and charged with accepting a bribe in exchange for an official
act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) (1984).
117 Mathews, 485 U.S. at 59. The defendant argued that the prosecution was unable to
demonstrate a prima facie case against him, while at the same time claiming entrapment.
Since entrapment is based upon the fact that a crime has indeed been committed, the
defendant was pleading contradictory defenses, which prior to the Mathews decision was
impermissible in a majority ofjurisdictions. Id. at 59-60 n.1.
118 Id. at 66.
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that the proper focus ought to be on the mental state of the
accused. 119
Mathews remains testament to the growing strength of the subjec-
tive entrapment analysis. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
withdrew his support of the objective approach, clearly signaling the
dominance of the Court's preference for subjective entrapment analy-
sis. Justice Brennan stated:
Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt
the view that the entrapment defense should focus exclusively on
the Government's conduct. But I am not writing on a clean slate;
the Court has spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I bow to
stare decisis, and todayjoin the judgment and reasoning of the Court
[to adopt the subjective analysis of entrapment].120
In addition to justice Brennan's change of opinion, the two dissenting
Justices, White and Blackmun, agreed with the subjective approach
and dissented solely with regard to the issue of inconsistent
defenses.' 21
Although the majority opinion does not strengthen the appeal of
the subjective approach, Justice Brennan's complete reversal of opin-
ion, coupled with the hands-off approach offered by Justices White
and Blackmun, demonstrates that support for the objective entrap-
ment test was extinct at the Supreme Court level. This trend in
Supreme Court jurisprudence runs counter to a clear trend among
the states, where the objective approach to entrapment had been
steadily gaining popularity 22 While many jurisdictions recognized
the shortcomings of the subjective approach to entrapment, 123 the
Supreme Court, rooted in stare decisis, remained firmly attached to the
subjective approach.
D. Current Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Jacobson v. United
States
The Supreme Court examined the entrapment defense most re-
cently in its 1992 decision ofJacobson v. United States.124 InJacobson, the
Supreme Court held that the U.S. Postal Service entrapped the defen-
dant as a matter of law in a Government attempt to arrest him for
violating the Child Protection Act.125
119 Id. at 62-63.
120 Id. at 67 (Brennan, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 73 (White, J., dissenting).
122 See Kar, supra note 35.
123 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
124 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
125 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1984).
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1. Facts
In February of 1984, Keith Jacobson, a 56 year old Nebraska
farmer who supported his elderly father, ordered two magazines and a
brochure from a California adult bookstore.' 26 These magazines were
entitled "Bare Boys I" and "Bare Boys II," and contained pictures of
naked preteen and teenage boys. Jacobson testified that he was
"shocked" that the magazines contained photographs of boys at such a
young age, as he had expected to find pictures of "young men 18 years
or older."1 27 Since the young boys in the magazines were not engaged
in sexual activity, both the sale and receipt of the material were legal
under federal as well as Nebraska law. 128
However, three months after Jacobson's receipt of the material,
Congress passed the Child Protection Act, which made it illegal to
receive through the mail sexually explicit depictions of children. 29
Under the rubric of the newly passed law, postal inspectors examined
the mailing lists of the California bookstore which had sent the "Bare
Boys" magazines to Jacobson and found the latter's name and mailing
address. With this information, the government began a two and a
half year campaign to induce Keith Jacobson to order child pornogra-
phy through the mail. Two government agencies attempted to coax
Jacobson into committing the illegal act by approaching him under
the guise of five fictitious organizations and one bogus pen pal.130 Af-
ter twenty six months of contact, Keith Jacobson finally ordered the
material, whereupon he was immediately arrested. 131
The creativity of the government's efforts pales in comparison
with its persistence. Postal inspectors initially approachedJacobson by
sending him a letter and membership application from the "American
Hedonist Society." The brochure described the fictitious organiza-
tion's doctrine: to promote "the right to read what we desire, the
right to discuss similar interests with those who share our philosophy,
and finally that we have the right to seek pleasure without restrictions
being placed on us by outdated puritan morality."132 After Jacobson
returned a "sexual attitude questionnaire," the government did not
contact him for about a year, at which time government agents ap-
proached Jacobson as a fictitious consumer research company called
"Midlands Data Research."133 The company sought responses from
126 Jacobson, 112 S. CL at 1537.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1538.
129 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) (A) (1984).
130 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, in Entrapment Case, Cast a Rare Vote Against Prosecutors,
N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1992, at Al.
131 Id.
132 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538-40.
'33 Id. at 1538.
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people who "believe in the joys of sex and the complete awareness of
those lusty and youthful lads and lasses of the neophite [sic] age." 3 4
Soon thereafter Jacobson informed the undercover government
agency: "Please feel free to send me more information, I am inter-
ested in teenage sexuality."13 5
Next, the defendant heard from the fictitious "Heartland Insti-
tute for a New Tomorrow" (HINT) whose credo read that it was "an
organization founded to protect and promote sexual freedom and
freedom of choice. We believe that arbitrarily imposed legislative
sanctions restricting your sexual freedom should be rescinded through
the legislative process." 3 6 In response to the sexual questionnaire
sent with HINT's material, Jacobson stated that he had an above
average interest in "[p] reteen sex-homosexual" material, as well as a
conviction to "be ever vigilant to counter-attack right wing fundamen-
talists who are determined to curtail our freedoms." 3 7 HINT re-
sponded to Jacobson's survey by telling him that it was a lobbying
organization dedicated to the repeal of "all statutes which regulate
sexual activities" as well as "lobbying to eliminate any legal definition
of the 'age of consent.' "138 HINT proposed to fund its lobbying ef-
forts through the proceeds of sales from an upcoming catalog.
Although Jacobson declined to initiate contact with anyone on a
list of potential pen pals offered by HINT, government agents ap-
proached him yet again under the guise of a pen pal with similar in-
terests in pornographic material. Jacobson responded to a letter from
the nonexistent "Carl Long," stating that: "As far as my likes are con-
cerned, I like good-looking young guys (in their late teens and early
20's) doing their thing together." 3 9 After writing two letters, neither
of which contained any reference to child pornography, Jacobson dis-
continued the communication. At this point, thirty-four months had
passed since the government found KeithJacobson's name on the Cal-
ifornia bookstore mailing list. The Postal Service had been actively
soliciting him for twenty-six months, yetJacobson offered the. govern-
ment no evidence that he had ever intentionally possessed child
pornography.
At this stage a second government agency, the Customs Service,
targeted KeithJacobson in its own child pornography sting operation.
As part of "Operation Borderline," the Customs Service approached
Jacobson as a Canadian company named "Produit Outaouais," by
134 Id.
'35 l
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1539.
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sending him a brochure containing advertisements for photographs
of young boys committing sexual acts. 140 At that time, Jacobson
placed an order which was never filled.' 41
The Postal Service maintained persistent contact with Keith
Jacobson. The agency again wrote to Jacobson under the guise of the
"Far Eastern Trading Company Ltd." which proclaimed itself as
having:
[D] evised a method of getting these [pornographic materials] to you
without the prying eyes of U.S. Customs seizing your mail.... After
consultation with American solicitors, we have been advised that
once we have posted our material through your system, it cannot be
opened for any inspection without authorization of a judge.' 42
The fictitious group next askedJacobson to send them a signed proc-
lamation stating that he was not a government agent seeking to entrap
the Far Eastern Trading Company Ltd.' 43 It then sentJacobson a cat-
alogue from which he ordered the magazine "Boys Who Love Boys,"
which contained photos of young boys participating in various sexual
acts. 44 Government agents arrested Keith Jacobson after they deliv-
ered the magazine to his home.
2. Procedural History
The government indicted Keith Jacobson for violating the Child
Protection Act of 1984,145 which prohibits the knowing receipt of "vis-
ual depiction[s] involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct." 46 At trial, the judge instructed the jury regarding
the entrapment defense, and the jury found Jacobson guilty. Sitting en
banc, a divided Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision, concluding that the government activity did not con-
stitute entrapment as a matter of law.' 47 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 148
3. Majority Opinion
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter and Thomas joined Justice
White's majority opinion which, consistent with Supreme Court prece-
140 Id.
141 Id. The Supreme Court opinion offers no reason whyJacobson's first order was left
unfilled. The lower court decisions omit any reference to it as well.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1539-40.
145 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1984).
146 18 U.S.C. § 2552(a) (2) (A).
147 916 F.2d 467, 470 (8th Cir. 1990).
148 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
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dent, 149 applied the subjective approach to entrapment. The Court
recognized that a government agent "may not originate a criminal de-
sign, implant in an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit
a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the
Government may prosecute."150 The Court held that in order to de-
feat Jacobson's entrapment defense, the government would have to
establish thatJacobson was independently predisposed to commit the
offense prior to any government contact. 51 The Court found that the
government failed to carry its burden. 52
In concluding that government agents entrapped Jacobson as a
matter of law, the Supreme Court examined the government's evi-
dence on Jacobson's alleged predisposition. The Court divided this
evidence into two groups: evidence gathered prior to the Postal Ser-
vice's mail campaign, and evidence discovered during the ensuing in-
vestigation. 153 The Court noted that the only indication ofJacobson's
state of mind prior to the government's investigation was his order of
Bare Boys I and II. The majority stated:
[T]his is scant if any proof of petitioner's predisposition to commit
an illegal act, the criminal character of which the defendant is pre-
sumed to know. It may indicate a predisposition to view sexually-
oriented photographs that are responsive to his sexual tastes; but
evidence that merely indicates a generic inclination to act within a
broad range, not all of which is criminal, is of little probative value
in establishing predisposition.' 54
In addition, the Court emphasized thatJacobson lawfully ordered
and received the Bare Boys magazines in February of 1984.155 This act
was not illegal under federal law until May of that year, or under Ne-
braska law until 1988.156 Thus, the Court concluded that evidence
concerningJacobson's legal transaction had no bearing on his predis-
position to commit the crime. The Court stated that "[ e ] vidence of
predisposition to do what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to
show predisposition to do what is now illegal, for there is a common
understanding that most people obey the law even when they disap-
prove of it."157
149 See supra notes 74-123 and accompanying text.
150 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442
(1932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1541.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1541-42.
156 The federal law is found at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (2) (A), while the Nebraska statute is
located at NEB. Ray. STAT. § 28-813.01 (1989).
157 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
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The Court also found that the evidence gathered during the gov-
ernment's investigation was insufficient to establish Jacobson's predis-
position to commit the crime. The Court noted that Jacobson's
responses to the government's communications were "at most indica-
tive of certain personal inclinations, including a predisposition to view
photographs of preteen sex and a willingness to promote a given
agenda by supporting lobbying organizations. Even so, petitioner's re-
sponses hardly support an inference that he would commit the crime
of receiving child pornography through the mails."158 Accordingly,
the essential question was not whether Jacobson was predisposed to
possess or view child pornography, but whether he was predisposed to
commit the crime of receiving child pornography through the mail.
As the applicable statute makes clear, only the latter is illegal. 159
In concluding thatJacobson had no predisposition to violate the
law, the majority retreated from a strict emphasis on Jacobson's state
of mind. Rather, the Court focused on the government's impermissi-
ble conduct. The Court reasoned that:
[B]y waving the banner of individual rights and disparaging the le-
gitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the availability of
sexually explicit materials, the Government not only excited peti-
tioner's interest in sexually explicit materials banned by law but also
exerted substantial pressure on petitioner to obtain and read such
material as part of a fight against censorship and the infringement
of individual rights. 160
As an example, the Court pointed out that the fictitious HINT pro-
moted itself as a lobbying organization "founded to promote sexual
freedom and freedom of choice," which funded its lobbying efforts
through the sales of pornographic brochures. 161 In addition, both
the American Hedonist Society and the letters written by "Carl Long"
endorsed the principles of individual rights.162
158 Id.
159 The Child Protection Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who-
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has
been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means including by computer or mailed or knowingly repro-
duces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign
commerce or through the malls, if
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section....
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (emphasis added).
160 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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The Court also noted that the two 1987 solicitations professed
that censorship was wrong and suggested thatJacobson had a right to
receive pornographic material.163 The majority felt that the two and a
half years of government effort were aimed at convincing Jacobson
that "he had or should have the right to engage in the very behavior
proscribed by law." 164 Thus, because "the Government [may not]
pla[y] on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguil[e] him into
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted,"
the majority determined that "[r] ationajurors could not say beyond a
reasonable doubt that petitioner possessed the requisite predisposi-
tion prior to the Government's investigation and that it existed in-
dependent of the Government's many and varied approaches to
petitioner,"165 and that the government therefore had entrapped
Jacobson as a matter of law.166
4. Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Scalia, authored the dissenting opinion. The dissent
voiced concern over three aspects of the majority decision.
First, the dissent felt that the majority failed to acknowledge the
reasonableness of the jury's conclusion thatJacobson was predisposed
to order child pornography through the mail. Justice O'Connor em-
phasized the fact thatJacobson ordered pornographic material from
the government as soon as they sent him an advertisement for materi-
als containing "young boys in sex action fun."167 Upon placing his
order, Jacobson demonstrated his willingness to order more: "I re-
ceived your brochure and decided to place an order. If I like your
product, I will order more later."168 However, for undisclosed rea-
sons, this order was never filled. The second time the government
offered material to Jacobson, the magazine advertised that it included
"11 year old and 14 year old boys [who] get it on in every way possible.
Oral, anal sex and heavy masturbation. If you love boys, you will be
delighted with this."169 Rather than characterize the government's ac-
tions as inducements to commit a crime, the dissent determined that
such actions were merely to insure thatJacobson was genuinely inter-
ested in child pornography. 170 Thus, the dissent concluded that evi-
163 Id. at 1542-43.
164 Id. at 1543.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1544.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Apparently, the dissent felt that the government waited before offering Jacobson
the chance to buy child pornography to avoid shocking Jacobson and alerting his suspi-
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dence of Jacobson's orders were sufficient to allow a reasonable jury
to conclude that his inclination to make such an order "was independ-
ent and not the product of the attention that the Government had
directed at [Jacobson] ."17
Second, the dissent felt that the element of timing implicit in the
majority's analysis was erroneous, and had the practical effect of im-
posing a requirement that the government have a "reasonable suspi-
cion of illegal activity before contacting a suspect."172 The cause of
this result, according to the dissent, was the majority's erroneous ex-
amination of predisposition at the moment of initial government con-
tact rather than at the time the government actually invited Jacobson
to commit the illegal act. According to Justice O'Connor, the major-
ity's "holding changes [the] entrapment doctrine. Generally, the in-
quiry is whether a suspect is predisposed before the Government
induces the commission of the crime, not before the Government
makes initial contact with him."173 Thus, Justice O'Connor stated that
the proper timing of the predisposition test was when the government
actually sent Jacobson the order forms containing pornographic
materials. 174
Justice O'Connor reasoned that the majority's treatment of the
timing element imposed a requirement that the government have
"sufficient evidence of a defendant's predisposition" before contact-
ing him. 175 The dissent likened this new requirement to that of a
need for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before beginning an
investigation. The dissent feared that this would provide an unwieldy
loophole through which criminals may slip by asserting that their pre-
disposition to commit the crime did not exist independently, but
rather was induced by government action.
Finally, the dissent found fault with the majority's interpretation
of "predisposition" as used in the subjective entrapment analysis. Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, the majority infused "a specific intent to
break the law" into the determination of predisposition. 176 However,
cions. It was therefore necessary for the government to first gauge Jacobson's interest
through solicitations. Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. Several scholars and authorities have supported the imposition of a "reasonable
suspicion requirement prior to allowing government solicitation. See e.g., Teri L. Cham-
bers, Note, United States v. Jacobson: A Call for a Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity as
a Threshold Limitation on Governmental Sting Operations, 44 ARL L. REv. 493 (1991).
173 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1546. The dissent provides the following hypothetical situations in which a
defendant would be able to manipulate the majority's interpretation of entrapment:
A bribe taker will claim that the description of the amount of money avail-
able was so enticing that it implanted a disposition to accept the bribe later
offered. A drug buyer will claim that the description of the drug's purity
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the applicable statute required only "knowing receipt of visual depic-
tions produced by using minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct."177 The dissent noted that Jacobson had developed "a
predisposition to view photographs of preteen sex" and stated that the
majority erred in concluding that Jacobson must be predisposed to
commit an illegal act in order to avoid being entrapped. 178 The dis-
sent's argument is straightforward: the subjective entrapment defense
is defeated if the prosecution can show that the defendant would have
committed the crime anyway, and since Jacobson was predisposed to
commit the acts which constitute the crime, his defense must fail.
II
ANALYsIs
This section will reexamine the application of the subjective en-
trapment analysis in Jacobson by discussing the criticisms voiced by the
dissent. This approach will illustrate some of the practical difficulties
in the subjective approach to entrapment. Next, this section will ad-
dress the policy reasons supporting both the objective and subjective
approaches to determine which is superior. Furthermore, it will de-
scribe a hybrid approach to entrapment, combining the best aspects
of both approaches. Finally, this section will discuss how this pro-
posed standard would have avoided the problems and controversies
evident in the Jacobson dissent.
A. The Dissent's Points of Contention 179
The dissenting opinion asserted a number of problems with the
opinion offered by the Jacobson majority. Justice O'Connor's dissent
stated that the majority: (1) altered the definition of predisposition;
(2) misapplied the timing element of the predisposition analysis; and
(3) inappropriately disregarded the reasonableness of the jury's con-
clusion with regard to the defendant's predisposition. 80 The dis-
sent's first point was erroneous. Although the dissent's second point
embraced the position adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, its rea-
soning was severely flawed. The dissent's third point, however, dem-
and effects was so tempting that it created the urge to try it for the first
time.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 The issues brought up by Justice O'Connor's dissent will be analyzed without
reference to the order in which they were initially raised because discussion of the later
issues necessarily relies upon determination of the earlier.
180 In addition, the dissent states that the majority's analysis necessarily forces the gov-
ernment to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before it initiates a sting opera-
tion. Footnote 206 discusses this issue further.
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onstrates quite forcibly the most serious flaw in the majority's
subjective analysis.
1. Redefinition of Predisposition
Justice O'Connor's dissent argued that the majority distorted the
entrapment analysis by materially altering the concept of a predisposi-
tion. The majority reasoned that, asJacobson's order of the Bare Boys
I and II magazines was legal, it added little to determining his predis-
position to break the law. The majority conceded thatJacobson had
expressed a "predisposition to view photographs of preteen sex" but
concluded that Jacobson's "responses hardly support an inference
that he would commit the crime of receiving child pornography
through the mails."181 Justice O'Connor characterized the majority's
argument as requiring "not only... [that] the Government show that
a defendant was predisposed to engage in the illegal conduct, here,
receiving photographs of minors engaged in sex, but also that the de-
fendant was predisposed to break the law knowingly in order to do
so."182
Justice O'Connor's dissenting argument was flawed on a number
of grounds. First, the dissent's assertion completely disregarded the
actus reus required by the statute at issue in Jacobson. The Child Pro-
tection Act, under which Jacobson was indicted, makes it a federal
offense to "knowingly receive [ ], or distribute [ 1, any visual depiction
that has been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign com-
merce.., if... the produc[tion] of such visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 83 From the
face of the statute it is apparent that the dissent was incorrect in stat-
ing that Jacobson's "'predisposition to view photographs of preteen
sex' . . . should have settled the matter,"18 4 because it was not a crime
merely to view photographs of preteen sex under the statute. Rather,
the Child Protection Act requiresJacobson to be predisposed to receiv-
ing child pornography through the mails. Therefore, a literal reading
of the statute shows that the dissent was incorrect in accusing the ma-
jority of having infused an unnecessary mens rea into the definition of
predisposition.
Second, the dissent erred in disregarding the policy arguments
forwarded by Justice White's description of an individual's reasons for
obeying the law. Justice White stated that society makes certain prac-
tices illegal and punishes their commission to deter individuals from
committing them in the future. It seems irrational, as well as contrary
181 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
182 Id. at 1546 (emphasis added).
183 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) (A).
184 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1546.
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to the basic deterrence theory of criminal justice, to claim that behav-
ior is not modified by the characterization of an activity as illegal. The
dissent overlooked this essential element when it disregarded the fact
that, prior to government contact, the only time Keith Jacobson or-
dered pornographic magazines was when it was legal to do so. If one
is to rely on the underlying rationale of the criminal justice system,
Jacobson would have been less inclined to order pornographic mate-
rial through the mail had he known the act was illegal. Therefore, it is
extremely relevant, even crucial, to note that "[e]vidence of predisposi-
tion to do what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show
predisposition to do what is now illegal .... "185 The dissent's allega-
tion that the majority skewed the proper definition of predisposition
is thus both flawed and groundless.
2. Timing of the Predisposition Analysis
Justice O'Connor's dissent argued that the Jacobson majority mate-
rially altered the entrapment analysis by compelling the prosecutor to
show that the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime pre-
dated the government's first contact with the defendant. Her dissent
declared:
The rule that preliminary Government contact can create a predis-
position has the potential to be misread by lower courts as well as
criminal investigators as requiring that the Government must have
sufficient evidence of a defendant's predisposition before it ever seeks
to contact him. Surely the Court cannot intend to impose such a re-
quirement, for it would mean that the Government must have a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity before it begins an
investigation, a condition that we have never before imposed.' 86
Justice O'Connor's analysis seems flawed on several grounds.
First, Sherman v. United States'87 and United States v. Williams,188 the
sources cited to support the position that predisposition must be de-
termined when the government invites the defendant to commit a
crime, are ambiguous. The dissent cited Sherman to support the argu-
ment regarding the timing element of the predisposition test because,
although entrapment was found as a matter of law in Sherman, "lit] he
Court found lack of predisposition based on the Government's nu-
merous unsuccessful attempts to induce the crime, not on the basis of
preliminary contacts with the defendant."189 However, the Sherman
Court emphasized that the prosecution's evidence was "insufficient to
185 Id. at 1542.
186 Id. at 1545 (emphasis in original).
187 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
188 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
189 Jacobson, 112 S: Ct. at 1544.
1994] 1023
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
prove petitioner had a readiness to sell narcotics at the time [the Gov-
ernment agent] approached him, particularly when we must assume
from the record [that] he was trying to overcome the narcotics habit at
the time."190 The opinion makes no mention of the specific timing
for the predisposition determination, but merely refers to the time
when the defendant was "approached."191 Such terminology is open
to a variety of interpretations.
In addition, Sherman relied on Sorrells v. United States192 to illus-
trate that entrapment exists "when the criminal design originates with
the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute." 93 The
structure of the above quote suggests that the proper time to analyze
predisposition is prior to initial government contact. The logical pro-
gression for government entrapment is as follows: first the govern-
ment derives the idea for the crime, then it implants in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the crime, and finally, the
government induces the crime. If this is indeed the order in which an
entrapment case develops, then the individual will always be predis-
posed to commit the crime by the time the government induces them.
Indeed, the only point at which one may determine whether the indi-
vidual is innocent is prior to the government's act of "implanting" the
disposition in the individual's mind, that is, prior to the government's
contact.
Justice O'Connor's dissent also used United States v. Williams194 to
support its interpretation of the proper timing of the predisposition
analysis. However, a close reading of Williams shows that it does not
support the dissent's position. Although the passage in Williams cited
by O'Connor initially appears supportive,' 95 the footnote goes on to
state: 'We do not rule out the possibility, however, that cases may
arise in which the agents in their preliminary contacts with a target
190 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
191 Id.
192 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
193 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442
(1932)).
194 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
195 The footnote begins:
The standard charge on entrapment requires the prosecution to prove that
the defendant was ready and willng to commit the crimes charged 'before
anything at all occurred respecting the alleged offense.' (citations omitted).
In many cases, including this one, undercover government agents discuss
non-criminal matters with a target before presenting a criminal opportu-
nity. Such preliminary contact is normally not conduct 'respecting the al-
leged offense'.... Simply cultivating the friendship of a target preparatory
to presenting a criminal opportunity is not inducement to commit a crime.
Id. at 618 n.9.
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indirectly suggest that a crime might occur, even though they do not
explicitly invite the target to commit one."196 The facts of Jacobson,
however, suggest that the initial government contact indeed "involved
... discussions 'respecting the alleged offense'" which, even under
the authority cited by the dissent, should have triggered the predispo-
sition analysis well before the expiration of twenty-six months of gov-
ernment solicitation. 197
Under Justice O'Connor's approach, in order to qualify as the
proper moment to analyze the defendant's predisposition, govern-
ment conduct must involve, at a minimum, the indirect suggestion
that a crime might occur.198 The facts of Jacobson show that the gov-
ernment's first contact consisted of an invitation to join the American
Hedonist Society, an organization designed to promote the "right to
seek pleasure without restrictions being placed upon us by outdated
puritan morality."199 Arguably, this initial invitation to defy legal re-
strictions indirectly suggested that a crime might occur. Thus, even
underJustice O'Connor's analysis, this should be the proper point for
a determination of Jacobson's predisposition.200
Other cases dealing with entrapment highlight the flaws inherent
injustice O'Connor's approach to the timing element. For instance,
the decision in United States v. MWoie20 1 contradicts the dissent's posi-
tion by suggesting that the predisposition analysis must occur when
the government makes its initial contact.20 2 The Whoie court held
that, in deciding the merits of an entrapment defense, the jury "must
... consider whether the defendant was predisposed before the induce-
ment to commit the offense." 203 Thus, Whoie reinforces the Jacobson
majority's conclusion that the determination of predisposition occurs
before the government begins its solicitation efforts.
Although Whoie reinforces the Jacobson majority's application of
the timing element, authorities remain divided as to the proper point
196 Id.
197 Jacobson, 112 S. CL at 1538.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Even assuming, arguendo, that the initial contact by the American Hedonist Society
was insufficient to create the indirect suggestion that a crime might occur, the next contact
sought responses from those who "believe in the joys of sex and the complete awareness of
those lusty and youthful lads and lasses of the [neophyte] age." Id. at 1538. Here there is a
pronounced connection between the communication (relating thejoys of viewing children
in a sexual setting) and the suggestion that the crime of receiving child pornography
through the mails might occur. Analysis of Jacobson's predisposition at this juncture
would look at events which occurred two years before those which the dissent wishes to
examine.
201 925 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
202 Id at 1483-84.
203 Id. at 1483 (emphasis added).
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at which to determine the defendant's predisposition. 20 4 The major-
ity of jurisdictions using the subjective entrapment approach define
the timing element as concentrating on "'the state of mind of a defen-
dant before government agents make any suggestion that he shall commit
a crime.'"205 Thus, although the Jacobson Court has now taken a posi-
tion on the timing element that is contrary to the view in a majority of
jurisdictions, the Court's holding is consistent with its prior case
law. 206
204 See MARcus, supra note 2, at 358-60 (citing United States v. Lasuita, 752 F.2d 249
(6th Cir. 1985) (the proper time of the predisposition analysis is at the moment of the
initial government contact); and Harrison v. State, 442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982) (the predis-
position analysis must occur "just before a government agent enlisted [the defendant's]
participation in the [illegal] venture")).
205 MARcus, supra note 2, at 358 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Dion, 762
F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)).
206 As was mentioned supra note 180, this Note will now examine and criticize an addi-
tional point asserted by the Jacobson dissent-that the majority's analysis necessarily forces
government officials to have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before initiating a
sting operation. Justice O'Connor's dissent erred by equating the requirement that predis-
position be shown at the outset of government contact with a requirement that the govern-
ment have a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct before initiating an investigation.
The dissent suggested that the examination of predisposition at the point of government
contact allows any "defendant [to] claim that something the Government agent did before
soliciting the crime 'created' a predisposition that was not there before." Jacobson, 112 S.
Ct. at 1545. An examination of the dissent's examples evince the impropriety of such a
claim:
For example, a bribe taker will claim that the description of the amount of
money available was so enticing that it implanted a disposition to accept the
bribe later offered. A drug buyer will claim that the description of the
drug's purity and effects was so tempting that it created the urge to try it for
the first time.
Id.
O'Connor's analogy to the process of solicitation and contact initiated by the govern-
ment with Keith Jacobson "exposes a flaw in the more limited" dissenting argument. Id.
These hypotheticals suggest that a "description" of the criminal activity may serve as temp-
tation to do the activity in question. A description of the money or drugs should not be
considered sufficient to create a disposition to accept a bribe or to use drugs. In order for
descriptions to instill a disposition to commit the act, the individual must be receptive to
such coaxing, that is, be predisposed to commit the act.
On the other hand, the government did not solicitJacobson through the use of espe-
cially enticing descriptions of the pornographic material in question. Although Jacobson
illegally ordered the pornographic magazines described as depicting "young boys in sex
action fun," there is no reason to believe that this advertisement was different from the
others sent to Jacobson by the government during the twenty-six month solicitation, or
from other pornographic brochures Jacobson encountered on his own. A logical conclu-
sion is thatJacobson ordered the pornographic materials as a result of improper govern-
ment inducement rather than from an independent predisposition. The government
approached Jacobson by appealing to his sense of individual rights and his interest in pro-
tecting freedom of expression under the guise of artificial lobbying efforts against govern-
ment censorship. Unlike the situation in the offered hypotheticals, these are desirable
inducements in a democratic society. Society generally promotes freedom of expression
and opposes the unfair censorship of unorthodox ideas. Toward this end, society tolerates
certain kinds of unpopular or unorthodox expression, including some types of pornogra-
phy. A direct comparison of the hypotheticals offered byJustice O'Connor with the actual
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3. Reasonable Finding
Justice O'Connor's third and most cogent criticism of the major-
ity's analysis concerned the failure to recognize the reasonableness of
the jury's conclusion that Keith Jacobson was predisposed to order
child pornography through the mail.
Under the subjective analysis of entrapment, the defendant's pre-
disposition is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. In
reaching a conclusion about predisposition, the jury can consider a
variety of factors that contribute to the mental state of the accused. 20 7
In order to constitute predisposition as a matter of law, "the evidence
must clearly have indicated that a government agent originated the
criminal design; that the agent implanted in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the offense; and that the defendant
then committed the act at the urging of the government agent."208
The evidence in the record shows that, at a minimum, reasonable
minds may differ with regard to whetherJacobson was predisposed to
order child pornography. Certainly, if the determination of Jacob-
son's predisposition occurs prior to government contact rather than
at the time the government invites the defendant to commit the
crime, the government bears a heavier burden. 20 9 Even assuming, ar-
guendo, that the proper stage to measure predisposition is at the mo-
ment of initial government contact, this Note argues that at the very
least the evidence supports a rational jury conclusion.
In determining the reasonableness of the jury's verdict, one must
initially examine the evidence in support of a finding of predisposi-
tion. The primary evidence was that Jacobson ordered two porno-
graphic magazines entitled "Bare Boys I" and "Bare Boys II." At a
minimum, this supports the conclusion that he was predisposed to
order pornographic material involving homosexual content. Not only
hadJacobson ordered pornographic material prior to the government
contact, but such materials were still in his possession two and one
half years after he received them. If Jacobson was truly "shocked"
when he found out that the "Bare Boys" magazines contained pictures
of naked boys, then the question of why he kept these materials for
the next several years remains. In addition, as the dissent stated, the
government twice offered pornographic material toJacobson, and he
facts of Jacobson show "the apparent lack of a principled basis," id., for extending the major-
ity's opinion to stand for the proposition that the government be required to have a rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity before initiating an investigation.
207 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors taken
into account in determining predisposition.
208 MARcus, supra note 2, at 123 (citing United States v. Shaw, 570 F.2d 770, 772 (8th
Cir. 1978)).
209 In fact, the majority admits Jacobson's predisposition at this time. Jacobson, 112 S.
Ct. at 1541.
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responded positively each time.210 Although predisposition analysis
must concentrate on the moment the government begins solicitation,
Jacobson's later conduct would also be relevant to the jury's determi-
nation of predisposition.2 11 The evidence discussed above suggests
that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that KeithJacobson was
predisposed to order child pornography through the mall.
However, a determination of the reasonableness of the jury's
findings must also examine evidence that suggests that the defendant
was not predisposed. IfJacobson's order of the Bare Boys magazines
suggests his propensity to commit the offense, then why did he not
order more after he received these materials? Jacobson could have
been assured of receiving them safely by availing himself of the same
channels as he had in the first instance. Furthermore, in response to
government letters sent via "Carl Long," Jacobson expressed his inter-
ests as being in "good-looking young guys (in their late teens and early
20's) doing their thing together."212 Assuming that the government's
attempts at anonymity were successful (a valid assumption since Jacob-
son eventually 'took the bait'), then one must assume that this re-
sponse was completely candid. This would suggest that Keith
Jacobson was predisposed to order homosexually-oriented sexual ma-
terial depicting consenting adults. Such a predisposition suggests
nothing criminal.
In sum, the above discussion suggests that the factual determina-
tion of whether Keith Jacobson was predisposed to order child por-
nography through the mail could have been decided either way by the
jury. The Supreme Court thus may have reached too far in overruling
the trier of fact and concluding thatJacobson was not predisposed to
commit the crime as a matter of law.
B. The Significance of Jacobson v. United States
Jacobson v. United States, decided by a narrow five justice majority,
illustrates some of the controversial concerns regarding current sub-
jective entrapment analysis. In particular, the dissent suggested two
important points that are arguably accurate: (1) the majority's rule
for timing of the predisposition analysis is at odds with the majority of
jurisdictions following the subjective approach, and (2) the record
supported the jury's conclusion that Jacobson lacked predisposition.
A question thus leaps to mind: why did the majority stretch the ac-
ceptable standards of entrapment analysis?
The likely answer is that the Jacobson majority stretched the ac-
cepted limits of the traditional subjective approach to entrapment to
210 Id. at 1543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
211 See MARcus, supra note 2, at 161-62.
212 Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1539.
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reach the truly "just" conclusion-that the government acted improp-
erly in pursuing KeithJacobson for twenty-six months to entice him to
commit a crime. The Court, however, wedded its decision to cases
which proclaim the subjective analysis as the correct approach in the
federal forum. Prior case law forced the majority to approach the
Jacobson case under the guise of the subjective approach, yet the Court
struggled to reach the "correct" or "just" conclusion within the con-
fines of this analysis.
This Note will now examine and compare the subjective and ob-
jective approaches to entrapment to determine the strengths and
weaknesses of each. The Note will introduce a proposed entrapment
standard that combines the strengths of both tests, while circum-
venting their difficulties. Finally, the Note will apply this new standard
to the facts of the Jacobson decision to show that the standard would
have allowed the Court to reach the desired result-that Keith Jacob-
son was entrapped as a matter of law.
C. Comparison of the Subjective and Objective Approaches
1. Subjective Approach
The subjective approach has several advantages, most notably the
concern that those who would not commit a crime on their own
should not be punished for committing it due solely to acts of the
government In other words, it is:
[U] nconscionable... [and] contrary to public policy... to punish a
man for the commission of an offense of the like of which he had
never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently never
would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired,
incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it.2 1 3
Since the subjective approach focuses upon whether the defendant
would have committed the offense, in theory it punishes only those
who would have committed the crime regardless of the government's
action.
The subjective approach also has some disadvantages. First, it
lacks a well-principled legal grounding. The Sorrells Courtjustified the
subjective approach based on congressional intent not to punish "in-
nocent" individuals enticed to commit a crime.214 The subjective ap-
proach to entrapment supports such congressional intent because an
individual who is not predisposed to commit the offense should be
considered innocent. However, such an argument is flawed. It is in-
consistent to say that the subjective test is based upon a legislative in-
tent to protect the innocent because a criminal act must necessarily
213 Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921).
214 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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have been committed to use the entrapment defense in the first place.
The defense becomes available only to demonstrate that the act was
committed because of improper government participation, rather
than because of the defendant's predisposition. Further, it does not
make sense to extrapolate congressional intent because Congress' ob-
vious intent was to criminalize these acts and punish those who com-
mit them. In addition, this rationale fails to explain why an individual
who is not predisposed to commit a crime will be entrapped if the
government induces the commission of the crime, but will be guilty if
a private individual performs the same acts of inducement.21 5
The subjective approach is also flawed because it focuses on the
past acts of the defendant to determine state of mind. This means
that the determination of criminal liability will hinge upon the defen-
dant's past behavior rather than solely on the defendant's behavior in
the instant action. As Justice Frankfurter stated, "permissible police
activity does not vary according to the particular defendant con-
cerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time and
in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because he has
been convicted before and is said to have a criminal disposition."216
Commentators have repeatedly criticized the subjective approach for
its reliance on the commission of prior acts which may be entirely
unrelated to the criminal act at hand.217 Thus, the most egregious
flaw in the subjective approach to entrapment is its reliance on factors
and conditions which are temporally separate from the criminal act
for which the defendant stands accused.218
2. Objective Approach
The objective approach to entrapment has several advantages.
The objective approach, unlike the subjective, depends wholly upon
the facts as developed in the instant action. The objective approach
also disregards the past acts of the defendant and focuses solely upon
the legitimacy of the government's participation in the present action.
215 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441-42 (1973); Grossman v. State, 457
P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969). See also Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire AfterJacobson v.
United States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CaM. L. & CRMINOLOCY
1055, 1068 (1993) (discussing predisposition and the problems it poses).
216 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (FrankfurterJ., concurring).
217 See, e.g., Camp, supra note 215, at 1066; Stephen E. Leidheiser, Note, Defense of
Entrapment: The Confusion Continues, 13 CUMB. L. REv. 373, 384 (1982); Mirakian, supra
note 42, at 336. In addition, note that it is impermissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, in both criminal and civil cases, to use evidence of particular conduct to show a
greater than average propensity to commit a crime. FED. R. EvD. 404.
218 Aside from the unfairness to the defendant unfortunate enough to have committed
an offense in the past, commentators have criticized the subjective approach as involving a
denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. See Yale Note, supra note 42.
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In addition, the objective analysis applies both prospectively and
retroactively. While the subjective analysis concentrates on insuring
that those who are wrongfully accused go free, the objective standard
aims to both evaluate the government's conduct in the present action
and insure that the standard appropriately guards against government
encroachment in the future.219 The objective approach thereby in-
sures that all citizens, notjust those privy to the present action, remain
free from the impositions of overzealous government enforcement
practices.
Furthermore, unlike the subjective approach, the objective ap-
proach to entrapment helps prevent wasteful government conduct.
In the Jacobson case, for example, government agents pursued the de-
fendant for twenty-six months before successfully enticing him to or-
der pornographic magazines. Under the objective analysis, this
extended solicitation period would contribute to a finding of entrap-
ment because of the unreasonableness of the government's conduct.
In contrast, the subjective analysis ignores the duration of the solicita-
tion provided the prosecution can show the defendant's predisposi-
tion to commit the crime.
One major criticism of the objective approach is that it places too
much emphasis upon the behavior of the hypothetical "reasonable
person."220 The concern is that the objective analysis takes place in a
vacuum of abstractness where intangibles battle each other. Because
the criminal justice system involves the stripping of a citizen's liberty
right in retribution for wrongs committed against society, the objec-
tive approach appears to be too embedded in the abstract to provide a
working basis for entrapment.221
In addition, commentators criticize the objective approach as an
improper means to effectively deter police misconduct and govern-
ment overreaching.222 This criticism asserts that the objective ap-
proach requires standards that are too inflexible to meet the needs of
effective government law enforcement through the use of sting opera-
tions.22 3 This criticism remains unconvincing, however, because it as-
sumes that an objective entrapment analysis must result in rigid,
narrowly tailored standards. Although these standards should be well
219 See Kar, supra note 35, at 211-12 (stating that defendants, courts, and the govern-
ment would all benefit from more clearly defined standards delineating the scope of ac-
ceptable police behavior).
220 See id. at 218; Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 216-24
(1976).
221 Kar, supra note 35, at 199, 218-20 (criticizing the objective approach and support-
ing a dual approach "that places the primary focus on the defendant, but allows a focus on
the police conduct under a due process rationale.").
222 Id. at 199, 210-24.
223 See iUL at 200-02, for a more detailed explanation of the disadvantages of the objec-
tive approach.
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defined, there is no prima facie requirement that they be restrictive.
An objective entrapment analysis could provide an outer limit of ac-
ceptable police behavior, within which each jurisdiction could pro-
mulgate narrower guidelines. 224
Commentators also criticize the objective approach for hindering
the detection and prosecution of "victimless" crimes such as bribery,
prostitution, and drug sales.225 This criticism is not well founded be-
cause it assumes that the objective approach precludes all government
solicitation and involvement in sting operations. 226 On the contrary,
proponents of the objective approach recognize that government
sting operations play a crucial role in the detection and prosecution
of "victimless" crimes. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissenting
opinion in United States v. Russel 227
[An objective entrapment analysis] does not mean, of course, that
the Government's use of undercover activity, strategy, or deception
is necessarily unlawful. Indeed, many crimes, especially so-called
victimless crimes, could not otherwise be detected. Thus, govern-
ment agents may engage in conduct that is likely, when objectively
considered, to afford a person ready and willing to commit the
crime an opportunity to do so.2 28
Thus, the objective approach does not eliminate government sting op-
erations. Rather, it eliminates the ability of government agents to
abuse the legal system by reaching beyond the proper standards of law
enforcement
D. The Solution: Proposal For A Hybrid Approach
The entrapment analysis currently applied in the federal court
system should be revised to address the inadequacies of both the sub-
jective and objective approaches. To do so, the federal court system
could adopt a hybrid entrapment approach which would combine the
strengths of both the subjective and objective approaches, while avoid-
224 See id at 220-22 for the argument that the Due Process Clause would be better
suited for providing workable standards because it would involve ad hoc balancing of the
seriousness of the crime with the need for government involvement, and that such balanc-
ing is inherently better than a set of "rigid" rules which would result from an objective
entrapment analysis. I feel, however, that the Due Process analysis is too ambiguous and
malleable to be effective in restricting government overreaching. Its ad hoc nature and
the need for balancing a variety of factors would not be useful in promoting expectations
with regard to permissible police conduct during sting operations.
225 See Leidheiser, supra note 217, at 384-85.
226 Such a preclusion may be a desired result, based upon commentator's assertions of
a societal aversion to sting operations. See, e.g., Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control Of
Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, And Agent Provocateurs, 60 YAuE LJ. 1091 (1951).
227 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
228 Id. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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ing many of their respective difficulties. The proposed hybrid test is
stated as follows:
Entrapment is an affirmative defense which exists when the Govern-
ment induces an individual to commit an offense if either:
(a) the Government attempts to convince the individual that
such an act is not illegal or employs methods which create a substan-
tial risk that the act will be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit the offense;229 or
(b) the individual is found not to be predisposed to commit the
offense at the time he is approached by the Government.
Because this new test is an affirmative defense, the defendant
bears the burden of proof. The accused must show by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that either of the two prongs are met. The first
prong of the proposed test incorporates the existing standards injuris-
dictions that have adopted an objective entrapment analysis.230 This
prong thus retains the benefits of the traditional objective approach;
it is aimed at deterring police misconduct and limiting government
overreaching in attempts to enforce the law.
The second prong of the hybrid test infuses a subjective element
into the analysis by focusing on the predisposition of the accused.
This step differs from the traditional subjective analysis because the
proposed standard is an affirmative defense: it is raised only if the
defendant defends with proof of a lack of predisposition. Of course,
once the defendant raises this subjective prong, the prosecution
would be allowed to rebut such evidence by attempting to prove pre-
disposition. In other words, the defendant alone chooses whether the
court's attention should focus on his past acts to determine
predisposition.
The hybrid approach has the benefits of the traditional subjective
approach because it concentrates on the individual, rather than ana-
lyzing entrapment in terms of the abstract "reasonable person." At
229 Some may claim that the characterization of "those ready to commit the offense"
necessarily inserts a certain degree of subjectivity into what is intended to be a purely objec-
tive analysis. Such a criticism is based upon a misinterpretation of the role played by this
limiting term. The reference to "persons other than those ready to commit the offense" is
merely a measuring stick used to gauge governmental behavior. It refers to a hypothetical
law abiding and reasonable person and determines if the government involvement would
have affected such a person's behavior. It's wording is similar to that of the Model Penal
Code, and likewise, "the application of the standard [does not] turn on the character of the
particular defendant." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 Explanatory Note.
230 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13; Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1989); Arkansas,
AR. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (Michie 1987); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1986);
Hawaii, HAW. REv. STAT. § 702-237 (1985); Iowa, State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 381-82
(Iowa 1974); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (1988), Michigan, People v. Patrick, 443
N.W.2d 499, 500 (Mich. 1989); NewYork, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1987); Penn-
sylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 313 (1983); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06 (West
1973); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303 (1990).
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the same time, this test avoids the subjective approach's major prob-
lem: determining an individual's predisposition (and thereby his
criminal liability) on the basis of past acts. The subjective aspect of
this test will only come into play when a defendant attempts to show
his lack of predisposition to commit the crime. Only then may the
prosecution focus on the defendant's past acts to illustrate his predis-
position. Therefore, the hybrid approach removes the inequity of
delving into the defendant's past acts because such past behavior can-
not be used unless the defendant attempts to prove a lack of such
predisposition.
The proposed standard thus recognizes both the traditional ob-
jective and subjective approaches and retains strengths of each. In
addition, the proposed standard is beneficial because either prong is
sufficient to absolve the defendant from liability. The defendant is
considered entrapped if either the government acted impermissibly
or the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime. While
both prongs strive to establish the same result, they approach the en-
trapment analysis in very different ways. In most cases, both prongs
would be satisfied. If, after being solicited by the government, an indi-
vidual commits a crime which he was not predisposed to commit
before coming in contact with the government, then the government
must have acted improperly.
The proposed standard should be promulgated by Congress and
presented to federal jurisdictions in the form of a statute. This proce-
dure would provide uniformity by defining clear boundaries within
which government agents may lawfully act. The present state of en-
trapment law has been criticized as being sorely in need of such uni-
formity.231 However, the language of the statute must not be too
intricate, as the detailed standards should be developed through use
and development of the common law. This approach would be both
flexible and uniform, with the necessary structure to provide guide-
lines to control future police conduct.
E. Application of the Proposed Test
Jacobson illustrates the flaws in the subjective approach to entrap-
ment. The majority had to reshape several elements of the traditional
subjective analysis232 in order to reach the "just" conclusion-that
Keith Jacobson was entrapped. Additionally, the Court had to get
around a jury's conclusion thatJacobson was predisposed to commit
the act. As is commonly the case,233 the jury likely based its conclu-
sion on Jacobson's past acts which were considered relevant to the
231 Leidheiser, supra note 217, at 394.
232 See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
233 MARcus, supra note 2, at 151.
[Vol. 79:9951034
NOTE-ENTRAPMENT
commission of the criminal act-that he had ordered the "Bare Boys
I" and "Bare Boys II" magazines from a California bookstore several
years before he was persuaded to order additional pornography by the
government. The jury's determination highlights the major flaw in
the subjective approach's emphasis on predisposition-the defen-
dant's predisposition is based upon acts committed before (perhaps
years before) the commission of the acts for which he is on trial. Au-
thorities and commentators on the criminal justice system have long
recognized the inequities of a system that determines an individual's
guilt according to past acts.23 4 This kind of determination is patently
unfair and should not be tolerated by our criminal justice system.
These doctrinal difficulties could have been avoided through the
application of the proposed hybrid approach to entrapment as set
forth above:23 5
Entrapment is an affirmative defense which exists when the Govern-
ment induces an individual to commit an offense if either:
(a) the Government attempts to convince the individual that
such an act is not illegal or employs methods which create a substan-
tial risk that the act will be committed by persons other than those
ready to commit the offense;236 or
(b) the individual is found not to be predisposed to commit the
offense at the time he is approached by the Government.
Application of this approach to the facts ofJacobson produces the same
result reached by the Jacobson majority: The government entrapped
Keith Jacobson as a matter of law.
1. The Objective Prong
The first step in analyzing Jacobson v. United States under the pro-
posed standard is to determine whether the objective prong is satis-
fied. Under the objective approach to entrapment, the analysis
focuses on the conduct of the government, rather than the predisposi-
tion of the defendant. The primary purpose of the objective ap-
proach is to deter police misconduct,237 while the subjective test is
234 See, e.g., Leidheiser, supra note 217, at 384; Mirakian, supra note 42, at 336; Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Past crimes
do not forever outlaw the criminal.").
285 See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 209.
237 See, e.g., MARcus, supra note 2, at 172 (citing People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 953
(Cal. 1979)). Some see the objective approach as not only aiming to deter police miscon-
duct, but also as aiming to provide standards by which to measure future police conduct-
standards which would secure legitimate expectations as to the proper degree of police
involvement. See, e.g., Mirakian, supra note 42, at 340-41.
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geared toward satisfying legislative intent that no innocent individual
is sent to jail.238
The objective elements are satisfied in theJacobson case. It cannot
be refuted that the government induced Jacobson to commit a crime
by ordering the pornographic magazine "Boys Loving Boys" from the
fictitious Far Eastern Trading Company. Therefore, the analysis turns
to whether either of subsection (a)'s objective elements have been
met.
The first clause of the objective prong focuses on whether the
government led the individual to believe that the act he was to commit
was not prohibited by law. The facts inJacobson suggest that this prong
would have been met. Indeed, the majority opinion in Jacobson ap-
pears to address this very point. "The evidence that petitioner was
ready and willing to commit the offense came only after the Govern-
ment had devoted 2 1/2 years to convincing him that he had or should have
the right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by law."239 Not only
has the first element of the proposed test has been met, but it also
appears that the Jacobson majority echoed the concerns imbued in the
objective analysis.
The second clause of the proposed test's objective prong would
also be satisfied under the facts of Jacobson. This clause focuses on
whether the government's conduct has created a substantial risk that
the crime would be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it. The government solicitations repeatedly empha-
sized freedom of speech and criticized government censorship fueled
by "outdated puritan morality."240 The government also created ficti-
tious organizations that supposedly lobbied against censorship. Ar-
guably, these efforts could prompt persons concerned with the
erosion of individual and privacy rights to fund organizations oppos-
ing government censorship through any means, including the
purchase of their materials.
Jacobson's own response to the solicitation lends support to this
conclusion. Jacobson wrote: "Not only sexual expression but free-
dom of the press is under attack. We must be ever vigilant to counter
attack right wing fundamentalists who are determined to curtail our
freedoms." 24 ' Jacobson's response indicates his concern with the ero-
sion of a basic constitutional right: the First Amendment's protection
of freedom of speech. It is plausible that an individual concerned
with these issues would purchase pornographic magazines in an effort
238 See, e.g., MARcus, supra note 2, at 172 (citing People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 953
(Cal. 1979)).
239 112 S. Ct. 1525, 1543 (1992) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
240 Id. at 1538.
241 Id&
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to contribute to a worthy cause, rather than to buy pornographic
magazines qua pornographic magazines. At the very least there is a
"substantial risk" that a criminal defendant such as Jacobson would be
motivated by one of these higher purposes. The facts in Jacobson,
therefore, meet the requirements of the objectiye prong included in
the proposed standard.
The proposed standard contains objective and subjective compo-
nents. The entrapment defense will prevail if the defendant can show
that either of these components have been satisfied. The above analy-
sis illustrates how the objective prong of the proposed test would have
been satisfied under the facts of Jacobson. It suggests that the objective
prong would have been met in either of two ways. If this Note repre-
sented an actual application of the proposed test, the defense of en-
trapment would be fully established. However, it is academically
useful to examine Jacobson further under the subjective prong of the
proposed test.
2. The Subjective Prong
The subjective portion of the proposed standard would be satis-
fied under the facts of Jacobson v. United States. Like the traditional
subjective approach to entrapment, the proposed subjective element
considers the accused's predisposition to commit the offense. How-
ever, unlike the traditional subjective treatment of predisposition, the
subjective element of the proposed test will look at predisposition evi-
dence only if the defendant attempts to show that he lacked the pro-
pensity to commit the offense.
To establish an absence of predisposition to commit the offense
of ordering child pornography through the mails, Keith Jacobson
could show the trier of fact that he never committed such a criminal
offense. This fact would indicate his lack of predisposition to order
child pornography. Jacobson would also want to introduce his finan-
cial support of his elderly father, thereby reflecting his commitment
to traditional family values. In addition, Jacobson could educate the
jury about his hesitant responses to repeated government solicitations.
For example, Jacobson informed the fictitious organizations created
by the Government that his sexual preferences involved "good-looking
young guys (in their late teens and early 20's) doing their thing to-
gether."242 Although the jury could view this evidence as some mea-
sure of the defendant's perversity, a limiting instruction would help
to restrict the application of this evidence solely to the issue of
whether Jacobson was predisposed to order child pornography.
Jacobson's response indicates no such inclination.
242 I& at 1535, 1539.
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3. Avoiding the Conceptual Difficulties ofJacobson
In Jacobson v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the subjec-
tive approach to reverse the defendant's conviction of ordering child
pornography through the mail. In so doing, the majority stretched
the traditional conception of the subjective approach to the entrap-
ment defense. The Jacobson dissent was quick to pinpoint two viable
criticisms of the majority's analysis: (1) the measurement of the de-
fendant's predisposition at a time different from that used by a major-
ity of jurisdictions, and (2) the rejection of the jury's reasonable
conclusion that the defendant was predisposed to order child pornog-
raphy through the mail.
The use of the proposed hybrid entrapment analysis would obvi-
ate the difficulties and concerns expressed in the Jacobson dissent.
First, satisfaction of the objective prong under the proposed analysis
would, in practice, end any further entrapment analysis and result in a
verdict for the defendant. This would eliminate any debate concern-
ing the trial court's predisposition analysis since predisposition is irrel-
evant in the objective approach. Moreover, since a jury's
deliberations would center around the propriety of government con-
duct rather than the defendant's predisposition to commit the of-
fense, the debate over the reasonableness of the jury's conclusions
about Jacobson's predisposition would also be irrelevant. The jury
would weigh only those facts pertaining to the government conduct:
the fact that the government solicited the defendant for twenty-six
months under the guise of five fictitious organizations and one bogus
pen pal; that the solicitations characterized the overtures as part of a
lobbying campaign against censorship; and that portions of these so-
licitations implied that the defendant should have the right to commit
the illegal act. In light of this evidence of government's misconduct,
the jury should acquit Jacobson on the basis of his entrapment
defense.
F. Comparison of the Proposed Approach To Alternative Hybrid
Approaches
The hybrid approach outlined above is not the first attempt to
combine elements of the subjective and objective approaches to en-
trapment. The following section compares the proposed hybrid test
with the hybrid approaches used by a number ofjurisdictions, as well
as those proposed by commentators.
1. New Mexico and Florida Approaches
The proposed standard is phrased in the disjunctive, such that
the defense will succeed if either the subjective or the objective
prongs are satisfied. The structure of the proposed standard closely
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resembles the hybrid approach to entrapment recently adopted by
New Mexico courts. In the 1987 case of Baca v. State,243 the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis244 by
holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert the defense
of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the
crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the stan-
dards of proper investigation.. ."245 The New Mexico approach is
superior to either the pure subjective or objective approach. The
standard proposed by this Note, however, is more useful than the Baca
test because it delineates the limits of acceptable police behavior
rather than couching its objective prong in ambiguous terms such as
"exceed[ing] the standards of proper investigation." 246 Such ambigu-
ous standards are of little help in providing either a reliable frame of
reference for criminal defendants or a deterrent to overreach police
conduct.2 4
7
Florida has also adopted a dual approach to entrapment, combin-
ing both the subjective and objective approaches so that satisfaction of
either element results in a successful entrapment defense.248
Although the Florida entrapment statute249only to impose an objec-
tive test, the 1985 decision of Cruz v. State50 mandates that a dual
approach be used. Under Cruz, the court first determines the permis-
sibility of police conduct. If this objective test is satisfied, then the
analysis turns to whether the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime. 251 The major difference between Florida's approach and
243 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987).
244 For an explanation of New Mexico's entrapment law prior to Baca, see Mandel,
supra note 73, at 139-42.
245 Baca, 742 P.2d at 1046.
246 Id.
247 For a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of the New Mexico hybrid ap-
proach to entrapment, see Mandel, supra note 73, at 156-60.
248 See Kelly M. Haynes, Note, Florida Adopts A Dual Approach To Entrapment-Cruz v.
State, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1171 (1986).
249 The Florida statute reads:
(1) A law enforcement officer, a person engaged in cooperation with a
law enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforce-
ment officer perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of the commission of a crime, he induces or encourages and, as a
direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting such
crime by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such crime will be committed by a person other than
one who is ready to commit it.
(2) A person prosecuted for a crime shall be acquitted if he proves by
a preponderance of the evidence that his criminal conduct occurred as a
result of an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier
of fact.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.201 (West 1992).
250 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985).
251 Id. at 521.
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the standard proposed by this Note is that the subjective prong of the
Florida analysis allows evidence of predisposition to defeat a defen-
dant's entrapment claim. The Florida rule takes into account the de-
fendant's past acts to establish his propensity to commit the offense in
the present action. The Florida approach, therefore, retains the most
egregious flaw of the traditional subjective entrapment analysis by al-
lowing the prosecution to defeat the entrapment defense on the basis
of prior bad acts, regardless of whether the defendant has chosen to
raise the issue of predisposition.2 52
2. Other Hybrid Jurisdictions
Besides Florida and New Mexico, several other jurisdictions have
adopted a hybrid approach to entrapment, either by statute orjudicial
decision. 253 However, unlike the hybrid approaches discussed above,
these jurisdictions require that both the subjective and objective ap-
proaches be satisfied to find entrapment.
The New Jersey entrapment statute,254 for example, contains
both an objective and subjective prong similar to the test proposed in
this Note.2 55 The main difference, however, is that the New Jersey
statute requires that both the objective and subjective prongs be satis-
fied. In other words, it requires that (1) the government conduct be
such that it would cause a reasonable person to commit the crime and
(2) the defendant was not predisposed to commit the offense. The
252 For a discussion of the shortcomings of this aspect of the subjective approach, see
supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
254 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12a (West 1982).
255 The New Jersey statute reads:
(a) A public law enforcement official... perpetrates an entrapment if...
he induces or encourages and, as a direct result, causes another person to
engage in [illegal) conduct.., by either
(1) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the be-
lief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other
than those who are ready to commit it.
(b) ... [A] person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves
by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to
an entrapment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12(a)-(b) (West 1982).
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Indiana2 56 and New Hampshire 257 statutes also require that both the
objective and subjective prongs be met in order to raise a successful
entrapment defense. These jurisdictions require a defendant to first
show entrapment via the objective standard, and then show a lack of
predisposition-that 'but for' the entrapment, the defendant would
not have committed the crime.
The approach proposed in this Note is superior to the hybrid ap-
proaches used in the above jurisdictions. These approaches share the
weaknesses of both the objective and subjective approaches individu-
ally. In fact, such approaches are inferior to a straightforward objec-
tive analysis because they allow an entrapment claim to be defeated by
a showing of predisposition. Like the subjective analysis, the defen-
dant's past acts are examined in order to predict his propensity to
commit the crime in the future. These hybrid approaches therefore
retain the major shortcoming of the subjective approach: The entrap-
ment defense can be defeated by the consideration of dubious and
arguably impermissible factors, namely the past conduct of the
defendant.
3. Hybrid Approaches Offered By Commentators
The entrapment standard proposed by this Note reflects the con-
cerns of protecting innocent individuals as well as restricting govern-
ment misconduct. Other commentators, such as Jeffrey Klar, have
also offered hybrid approaches to entrapment which embrace both of
these concerns.258 Klar combines the traditional subjective analysis
256 The Indiana statute reads:
It is a defense that:
(1) The prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a law
enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to
cause the person to engage in the conduct; and
(2) The person was not predisposed to commit the offense.
(b) Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit the
offense does not constitute entrapment.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-9 (Bums 1985).
257 The New Hampshire statute reads:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense because he
was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement official or by a
person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement official, for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence against him and when the methods used to ob-
tain such evidence were such to create a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it.
However, conduct merely affording an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1986). Although strictly objective on its face, the statute has
been interpreted by the courts to imply that an entrapment defense involves elements of
both the subjective and objective tests. See State v. Little, 435 A.2d 517 (N.H. 1981).
258 KIar, supra note 35.
Damon Camp has suggested a three step entrapment analysis which also utilizes ele-
ments of both the traditional subjective and objective approaches. See Camp, supra note
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and a concern for potential violations of the Due Process Clause. His
approach to entrapment may be paraphrased as follows:
Step 1: The court determines whether the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the offense.
Step 2: If predisposition is established, then the court determines
whether the government solicitation violates Due Process. 25 9
The similarities between Professor Kar's dual approach and the
approach proposed in this Note are apparent. Notably, if a court de-
termines that the defendant lacked the predisposition to commit the
offense, it may conclude that the government unlawfully entrapped
him. Similarly, a showing of egregious government conduct will ne-
cessitate a finding of entrapment. Finally, the approaches proposed
by both Professor Kar and this Note contain independent prongs: in
both cases, a satisfaction of either the subjective or objective prongs
results in a successful entrapment defense.
Although similarities between the two approaches exist, there are
many differences. First, Professor Kar's test uses a traditional model
of the subjective entrapment analysis. This Note relies on a more
modern approach. While both Professor Kar and this Note argue for
subjective prongs that involve a determination of the defendant's pre-
disposition, the former would allow the prosecution to use the defen-
dant's prior acts to demonstrate predisposition in every entrapment
case. The latter would only focus on the defendant's past acts if and
only if the defendant chooses to prove that he was not predisposed to
commit the crime. In other words, the approach offered by this Note
would only look to past acts if the defendant raises the propensity ar-
gument. By looking at criminal predisposition in all cases, Professor
Kar's approach retains one of the major weaknesses of the subjective
215, at 1085-87. Under Camp's analysis, the defendant must first show evidence of govern-
ment impropriety. l at 1086. If the accused successfully meets this threshold test, the
second step of Camp's analysis allows the government to rebut the defendant's contentions
with evidence of the defendant's predisposition. Id. The third and final step of Camp's
proposed entrapment test imposes upon the trier of fact the obligation to balance the
severity of the government misconduct against the defendant's predisposition. Id. at 1087.
While Camp recognized problems with his approach, he concluded that his test "clearly
balances the primary concerns of both the subjective and objective approaches to entrap-
ment." Id. However, Camp disregards the fact that his standard would be difficult, if not
impossible, to use in practice. The final step of Camp's analysis requires the jury to bal-
ance two incomparable factors: the predisposition of the defendant and the impropriety
of government conduct Comparing these two different concerns would be analogous to
comparing proverbial "apples and oranges." As these two factors lack a common frame of
reference, "balancing" them against one another would be impossible in practice. Juries
would either be unable to reach a verdict, or would base their decisions on additional
factors not included in Camp's analysis.
259 Kar, supra note 35, at 216.
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approach to entrapment: it allows the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused to be determined on the basis of prior behavior.2 60
Second, Professor Klar's approach differs from the one proposed
here by incorporating a due process element in his objective prong.
Both our analyses share a common goal: to limit government intru-
sion by establishing proper limits of police investigation. Professor
Klar argues that the flexibility of due process makes it a better vehicle
to promulgate standards of police behavior.26 ' However, the flexibil-
ity inherent in the due process analysis is the greatest weakness of
Klar's approach. One of the major goals of both this Note's and Klar's
entrapment approaches is to provide a workable framework which
would guide police and government conduct in the future. Flexibility
is indeed a necessary component to an effective entrapment analy-
sis,262 but in order to provide standards to restrain impermissible po-
lice activity, flexibility must be limited. This Note's approach is
superior to Professor Klar's reliance on due process because it retains
a degree of flexibility, yet defines the outer boundaries of appropriate
police involvement.2 63
CONCLUSION
The two competing approaches to the entrapment defense, the
objective and subjective, have left the doctrine of entrapment in a
constant state of flux. In an effort to get the best of l6oth worlds, a
minority ofjurisdictions have developed hybrid approaches to entrap-
ment. The Supreme Court, however, has stubbornly retained the sub-
jective analysis, which led to the controversial result in the recent case
of Jacobson v. United States.264
A superior approach to the entrapment defense is a dual analysis
combining the advantages of both the subjective and objective ap-
proaches. Under such an analysis, a defendant may be acquitted if
she can satisfy either a subjective or an objective test. Such an analysis
retains the advantages of the objective approach. It is prospective,
260 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text for an explanation of the weaknesses
inherent in the subjective approach to entrapment.
261 Klar, supra note 35, at 220. Recall the ease with which the Due Process Clause has
been a fountainhead of new fundamental rights, and new standards of governmental be-
havior. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interpreting the Fifth Amend-
ment to require police officers to inform individuals in custody of their constitutional
rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause to include the right to privacy).
262 Indeed, this Note has recognized the merit of an objective entrapment analysis
which retains a good deal of flexibility. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
263 The objective approach would allow each jurisdiction to establish its own standards
of police conduct-either by statute or by common law. Flexibility would be attained
through typically vague statutory language, or through the evolution of the common law.
264 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
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and provides a framework to limit future government misconduct. It
also retains the advantages of the subjective approach. It allows an
individual who is found not to be predisposed to use the defense, thus
remaining faithful to the general congressional intent that the inno-
cent not be punished.
The rule proposed in this Note avoids the weaknesses of both the
objective and subjective approaches. It eliminates the subjective test's
drawback: the possibility that the trier of fact may look to the past acts
of the defendant to determine his predisposition and thereby defeat
the entrapment defense. Under this Note's proposed test, the defen-
dant is tried solely for the acts committed in the case at hand, rather
than those committed in the past. The proposed test also eliminates
the drawback posed by the objective test: the fact that the decision of
guilt or innocence be determined by examining the likely effect of
government solicitation on the hypothetical "reasonable person."
This test is anchored in reality due to the infusion of a subjective
prong, which emphasizes the actual predisposition of the defendant.
The time is right for federal courts to adopt a dual approach to
entrapment that combines qualities of both the subjective and objec-
tive analyses. Such an approach is superior to both the traditional
subjective and objective approaches, as well as those hybrid ap-
proaches implemented by a number ofjurisdictions, or those offered
by commentators. The adoption of a dual approach to entrapment
would obviate the need for federal courts to stretch traditional entrap-
ment doctrine in order to reach the "just" result, as occurred in Jacob-
son v. United States.
Scott C. Patont
t The author would like to thank Kimberly and Granite for their support and en-
couragement, as well as the members and staff of the Cornell Law Review for their editing
enthusiasm. Any errors are, of course, my own.
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